THE
Military Panorama,
OR
OFFICER'S COMPANION
FOR
January 1813.

EMBELLISHMENTS.

Portrait of Gen. the Earl of Moira, F. R. S. F. S. A. M. R. I. A.
Map of the Theatre of the War in Russia.

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TO CORRESPONDENTS.

A VALUABLE article in this Number, on the Cossacks, is particularly deserving of atttention, and we are highly indebted to the literary correspondent who favoured us with it. We regret very much that Lieutenant Scott's letter did not arrive in time for our present publication, but it will appear in our next. If this Officer would give to the army a concise statement of Military Jurisprudence according to the best authorities, it would be a highly valuable present, and we should have much satisfaction in inserting it in the Panorama. The letters of "A Veteran," "J. N." "An old Soldier," "Miles Veteranus," and several others, were not received sufficiently early for this Number; but they will have our particular attention.

The most correct Map of the Theatre of the War in Russia accompanies this number; and a Narrative of the whole Campaign, founded on official documents and valuable communications from the seat of action, will be very shortly given. In the Military Panorama no article of the above important description will be published except such as the army may put implicit reliance on; and we shall avoid the character of Journalists, by rejecting idle reports and vague statements, which are to be contradicted by later accounts. The character of a Military Work, which is intended for a Companion to Officers at all periods, would be disgraced by such productions, and nothing but what may justly claim a prominent post in the library of the Officer and Gentleman—in the cabinet of the student and scholar—will receive our notice.

Several Biographies, which are in readiness for publication, will appear the first opportunity: in our former notes, the names of the distinguished Officers to whom they relate, have been mentioned: Portraits of such as can be procured will also be given, and proof impressions taken for the accommodation of Officers personally interested, which may be procured at the publisher's.

In the following Number, an article on the Disturbances in India, from the pen of a gentleman particularly well informed of the origin and circumstances attending that event, will be presented to the attention of our readers, and we are gratified in observing, that the opinions and statements of its elegant author perfectly coincide with our own. We esteem it a most essential duty on the part of the legislature of every kingdom to pay respect and honor to its gallant defenders, and we shall always support the *rights* of the Army, expose acts of injustice, more particularly disgraceful attempts to subdue the honorable spirit of its officers, and a wanton disregard to the conduct which, as gentlemen, they individually and collectively have an undoubted right to demand. We also maintain, that every respect is due to the laws and the civil power, but it it not to be supposed that respect can be observed, or can exist, if those entrusted with the latter power arrogate to themselves an undue right, and presuming on the attachment of the army to the laws, hesitate not in mad attempts at degrading its honorable character, and insulting its most worthy members:—Englishmen who have bled in defence of their country—who embrace the profession of arms from honorable views—are not to be degraded as slaves, and bow to the nod of a civil magistrate, delegating to himself powers which his government never entrusted him with, which justice could never sanction, and which brave men could never submit to. A conduct, similar to that pursued in Madras, has been practised by a General Officer entrusted with the government of a District in another quarter of our Indian possessions: in this case a refusal to dine with the Commandant has been construed into a disobedience of orders,—and officers have been superseded under this arbitrary order. At a dinner given by the said General, the Officers were all invited, and, though the conduct of the Commandant had been such as to disgust them, they, in obedience to the order, attended; but every one refused either to eat or drink with the host. On the receipt of further particulars we shall bring the subject more fully before the army and the public: it will be sufficient for the present to observe, that a gallant officer is on his passage to this country for the purpose of demanding a reparation of his injuries, and to exhibit charges against the officer of rank herein alluded to.

33, Orchard-Street, Portman-Square,
December 30, 1812.

Errata.

In page 23, line 28, *for* "150,000," *read* "1,500,000."

Genl. the Earl of Moira.

Engraved for the Military Panorama

by H.R. Cook from the Picture by M.A. Shee R.A.

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THE

Military Panorama,

OR

OFFICER's COMPANION FOR JANUARY 1813.

MILITARY BIOGRAPHY.

GEN. THE EARL OF MOIRA, F.R.S. F.S.A. M.R.I.A.

FRANCIS Rawdon Hastings, Lord Hastings, Baron Rawdon, and Earl of Moira in Ireland, was born the 7th of December, 1754. Having received all the advantages of a very liberal education, and acquired those accomplishments which grace both the scholar and the gentleman, the subject of this sketch made a tour on the Continent, and visited the courts of France, Germany, and Italy; but the American war breaking out, and his ardent desire of becoming a member of the military profession induced his Lordship to return to England.—Immediately after his return, he entered the army, and embarked for America early in 1775.

The first engagement of any importance in which the Earl of Moira, then Lord Rawdon, had an opportunity of particularly distinguishing himself, was at the bloody fight of Bunker's Hill, where the intrepidity of his Lordship obtained the particular notice of General Burgoyne, who was pleased to express in the most flattering terms to the British government, the admiration he entertained of this young officer, and the conviction with which he was impressed, that his Lordship would become one of the brightest ornaments of the military profession. Notwithstanding the loss of British officers at the battle of Bunker's Hill was so excessive, nineteen being killed, and seventy wounded, Lord Moira was one of the fortunate few who escaped unhurt, although he received two shots through his cap. Indeed he was said to have been the second person who entered the enemy's works, having been pre-

ceded by a serjeant, who experienced his Lordship's liberality on that occasion. The next operation of the army, the storming of Fort Clinton, afforded another opportunity for the display of Lord Moira's judgment and courage.

In 1778, Lord Moira was nominated Adjutant-General to the British army in America, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and in that distinguished and honorable situation the energies of his Lordship's mind were called into action, and advantageously exercised, both on the retreat of the British army through the Jerseys, from Philadelphia to New York, in the action at Monmouth which followed, and at the siege of Charlestown.

As the American line was chiefly composed of the very lowest order of Irishmen, his Lordship undertook to raise a corps at Philadelphia, called the Volunteers of Ireland, which was soon recruited from the enemy's ranks, and became eminently distinguished for its services in the field. In the first battle of Camden, under the command of his Lordship, exactly one half of the regiment was killed or wounded, and in that of Hobkirk Hill a still greater proportion. The officers who were selected from the regular regiments, could not, however, with all their zeal and abilities, extirpate that desire of change which impelled their men to desert, until his Lordship adopted an extraordinary expedient, which discovered a complete knowledge of the human heart. A man caught in the act of going over to the enemy was brought on the parade before the whole regiment, to whom he was delivered up by his Lordship in a most impressive way to be judged, punished or acquitted. The officers were ordered to withdraw, and leave every thing to the private soldiers, who, in a few minutes, hung their offending comrade on a tree, and the example was most effectual. Such repeated proofs of military talent and enterprising spirit could not pass unnoticed by the Commander-in-Chief, and consequently, this gallant officer was specially appointed to the command of a distinct corps of the army in South Carolina, which province was invaded by the American General, Gates, and his Lordship had so arranged his plans, as with a very inconsiderable force to maintain his principal positions. Notwithstanding the superiority which the enemy possessed in point of number, some favorable opportunities were not wanting to have induced him to risk a battle, if his own glory had been consulted instead of the

public good; but he adhered to the measures concerted with Lord Cornwallis, who, on reaching the army, found all the forces collected and disposed to his utmost satisfaction. At the memorable battle of Camden, which succeeded on the 16th of August, 1780, Lord Moira commanded one wing of the army, and greatly contributed to the glorious result of that day. When Lord Cornwallis pursued, soon afterwards, the American army towards Virginia, Lord Moira with a very small force was left to defend the extensive frontiers of South Carolina against the provincial generals, Marion and Cumpter: but General Green having contrived after the battle of Guilford to turn Lord Cornwallis's left, fell suddenly on Lord Moira, who had only a few redoubts to defend his sick and magazines, at Camden. The intention of General Green was evidently to carry these by assault, and as this was likely to be attempted during the night, the troops were withdrawn from them at dusk, and prepared to surprise the enemy on the open ground at the moment when they commenced their attack on the works.—General Green, however, was induced to act more cautiously, and wait for the arrival of his artillery; and Lord Moira, who saw all the difficulty of effecting a retreat, resolved to become the aggressor.—Accordingly, on the 25th of April, 1781, he chose the hour of mid-day to make his attempt, when it was least expected, and his march was concealed by a circuitous route through thick woods; having by this sudden and rapid manœuvre reached Hobkirk Hill, even before the American General, Green, was aware of his Lordship's movements, and who not only supposed himself secure from any attack, on account of the vast superiority of his force, but also from a very extensive swamp which protected him on the weak, and perhaps only assailable point of Hobkirk's Hill. Lord Moira approached the hill with a narrow line of front, and the enemy's picquets being driven in, an alarm was immediately spread through the American camp. General Green, who possessed a greatness of mind far superior to any of the American generals, perceived the danger of his situation, and with the utmost promptitude decided upon the measure most likely to repel the British. Finding that Lord Moira advanced in a narrow front, he immediately commanded a heavy fire of grape-shot from his batteries, and under their protection charged down Hobkirk-Hill. The British leader discerning Green's design, immediately extended

the whole of his line, and thus completely disconcerted the enemy's plan. The foresight of Lord Moira gained him a complete victory. Having pursued the Americans to the summit of the hill, after silencing their batteries, he charged them, and put the whole to the route. General Green rallied his troops several times, but the continual charges of the British, and the ardour with which they advanced on the enemy, were irresistible, and they were put to flight on all sides. This success enabled Lord Moira to concentrate his army, and being joined by some reinforcements from the coast, he succeeded in driving the enemy to a considerable distance; but the capture of Lord Cornwallis, which soon followed, and the declining state of our American affairs, rendered it necessary that the troops should be withdrawn towards Charlestown, where both armies remained inactive from the excessive heat, and perhaps a mutual conviction, that the contest was nearly at an end.

At Charlestown, an American prisoner, named Isaac Haynes, who had been allowed to take the oath of allegiance, and received his liberty on that account, contrived in the most artful manner to corrupt a numerous body of newly-attested militia-men, having first secured for himself the rank of Colonel in the American army. The detection of his villany did not take place till the moment the enemy were advancing on Charlestown, and when he was marching the militia-men to join them. A Court of Inquiry immediately sat, entirely by the direction of the Commandant of Charlestown, to whom this duty appertained independently of Lord Moira, and Haynes was publicly executed, but not before his Lordship had endeavoured to procure the man's pardon by a private communication with some loyalists, whom his Lordship requested to petition in his behalf. The execution of Haynes being misrepresented in England, it was conceived by many to have been an act of military despotism, which was not satisfactorily removed until his Lordship's return to this country.

Notwithstanding Lord Moira experienced a severe and dangerous attack from the heat, which obliged him to be conveyed in a cart, his Lordship gave directions for the commencement of the march, and determined on remaining with the army as long as practicable. In this situation he continued issuing his orders, and directing the route and disposition of his forces, till his malady arrived at so alarming a state as to render his Lordship's return to England

absolutely necessary; but the vessel in which he embarked was unfortunately captured and carried into Brest. Lord Moira was almost immediately released, and on his arrival in England was honored with repeated marks of distinction and kindness by his illustrious sovereign, who amongst other favors, was graciously pleased to create this gallant officer a British peer, and to appoint him his Aide-de-Camp.

In the latter part of the year 1793, Lord Moira was appointed Commander-in-Chief of an army intended to co-operate with the Royalists in Brittany, and all the ancient nobility of France were to serve with him. It is remarkable too, that the late General Sir Charles Stuart, who was one of the highest characters and best officers of the age, *offered to wave his seniority of rank, and be under the command of Lord Moira on this occasion.*—But before any operation could be undertaken, the republicans had triumphed completely. Some of the troops, however, were encamped at Southampton during the campaign of His Royal Highness the present illustrious Commander-in-Chief in Flanders; when the situation of the British army and that of the allies was rendered extremely critical, and the former were compelled to retreat through Brabant to Antwerp. Lord Moira was dispatched with a reinforcement of 10,000 men to aid His Royal Highness, with whom, though nearly surrounded by much superior armies in point of number, Lord Moira, by a well-directed movement, effected a junction at Malines, near Antwerp, and thus relieved the British army from the difficulties of its situation, to the mortification of the French General Pichegru. The dispatch which his Lordship had employed in embarking his troops without either tents or heavy baggage from Southampton, and in debarking them at Ostend, the 30th of June 1794, prevented the enemy's ascertaining the actual strength under his Lordship's command, which was an object of serious importance, and to maintain it, Lord Moira directed his Quarter-Master-General, the late General Doyle, to issue orders that quarters should be provided at Bruges for 25,000 troops, although the force under his Lordship did not exceed 10,000. The delusion was admirably maintained, and General Pichegru, who was in the vicinity of Bruges, with a force much greater than that of the British general, completely deceived. Notwithstanding the orders which his Lordship had directed

General Doyle to issue, and although the army were labouring under excessive fatigue from the heat of the weather and the greatest privations, he did not deem it prudent to halt at Bruges, the enemy hanging upon his flanks, and proceeded therefore to Ghent, where General Clairfait was stationed, and immediately on his arrival proposed to that officer an attack on the enemy, but which was objected to. Lord Moira, therefore, continued his march with the utmost rapidity to Alost. At this place, where his Lordship remained three days, the British army was nearly cut off. Some German cavalry posted on the outskirts of the town, as an advanced picquet, were removed, contrary to the orders of the British General, and a body of the enemy's cavalry entered Alost and surprised our troops: they were, however, immediately attacked with the greatest gallantry, by a small detachment, and repulsed. Thus the numbers of this little, but gallant band were still concealed from the enemy, which, had they ascertained, a junction with His Royal Highness the Duke of York would most certainly have been prevented. Lord Moira having joined the Commander-in-Chief, was entrusted with an important command, which his military talents particularly entitled him to.

Since the above expedition the gallant Earl of Moira has been unemployed in a military capacity against the enemies of his country. In the year 1803, his Lordship was appointed Commander of the forces in North-Britain. The parliamentary conduct of Lord Moira has displayed a continued series of patriotism and ability, and his domestic life an enviable pattern to English noblemen.—It may with justice be observed, in delineating the character of this officer, and with every sentiment of impartiality, that Great-Britain does not contain a veteran more patriotic and liberal, in whom the social virtues, the ornaments of polished manners and general talent have more conspicuously appeared; temperate, yet liberal and hospitable to an excess; possessing the qualifications of a mind so honorable as even to escape the detractions of slander. Lord Moira stands on a proud eminence, respected, honored, and revered by all who have the happiness of his acquaintance or a knowledge of his merits.

From the preceding sketch of his Lordship's character it will not appear extraordinary that he should have been long honored with the confidence and friendship of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. The illustrious and accomplished Heir Apparent

is fully sensible of the many excellent qualities which adorn the Earl of Moira, and, as a reward of his faithful services, His Royal Highness has recently been pleased to appoint him to the high and distinguished office of Governor-General of Bengal, and Commander-in-Chief of the army in the East Indies.

During the short administration of Mr. Fox, Lord Moira filled the important situation of Master-General of the Ordnance. His Lordship is Constable of the Tower of London, one of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's Council in Cornwall, a General in the Army, and Colonel of the 27th, or Inniskillen Regiment of Foot.

London, October 10, 1812.

OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
MILITARY SYSTEMS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, &c &c.

It may be proper to state that the Author of the following Essay has already published some of the opinions he entertains on Military subjects in another Periodical Work. The observations he has had an opportunity of making upon his favourite system are now given in greater detail for the purpose of being inserted in the Military Panorama; and not without hopes that they will be read with considerable interest. By giving his Essay a place in this Work, the readers of the Panorama will be enabled to contrast the writer's ideas with those of the Honorable Colonel Dillon, which will be reviewed in the following Number.

I HAVE long considered the Military System of the British Empire, which might certainly be rendered the most beautiful and simple in nature, as extremely defective in many material points; and, although some of my opinions on this important subject have been made public through various channels, on the suggestion of the moment, and have already been the topic of much literary discussion, I cannot resist the opportunity afforded, through the medium of the Military Panorama, of again introducing my ideas to the notice of the Army, and of those whose laudable ambition it is to render the Military Profession most acceptable and honorable to the minds of liberal and enlightened men. As no evil can originate from a plain, but unreserved, statement of my opinions; and I am impressed with a firm conviction that they do

not militate against those entertained by a very considerable part of the Army; and the subject being treated with that due degree of delicacy which it requires, I flatter myself they may not be deemed unworthy of attention.

No person, acquainted with the duties attached to the profession of arms, will venture to disprove, that discipline is the main spring by which a military force can be made serviceable, or ought to be depended upon in the hour of danger:—without it, "armies are a contemptible rabble*," and with it, order may be maintained and harmony preserved to the mutual advantage of both officers and privates. When it does not exist, imperfection must reign in many branches of the military system, and often to such an extent as to constitute those forces, designed for the preservation of the independence of the kingdom, not only inefficient for the accomplishment of this grand object, but also dangerous to the liberties of the State.

Much commendation has been lavished upon the establishment of Volunteer Corps throughout this country. The measure in itself, when we consider the cause which gave rise to it, was extremely politic, as a system of civil power, but, as a Military force, I cannot view it otherwise than in the light of a false expectation, a resource on which great hopes were raised, but in no ways competent to effect its proclaimed purpose—to maintain security from invasion. As the Volunteer System permitted, in the first instance, every one who became a member, an uncontrouled liberty over himself, and placed him under no immediate restriction of obedience to officers, constituted such, not from ability, but from their superiority of condition in life:—was it ever in the contemplation of British Legislators, or enlightened men, that the necessary subordination, the necessary attention, and the most implicit obedience to orders, could be maintained through the voluntary inclination of the members, which points are so highly essential in services of hazard and importance. A Volunteer is his own master;—he attends at his pleasure,—is under no restriction,—obeys when and whom he pleases,—and if the duty, whereon he is to be employed, does not accord with his feelings, is at liberty to resign. To stile a volunteer a soldier is a perversion of the term. A man who comes forward to defend his country should embrace the profession of arms with all its necessary restrictions, otherwise he is no volunteer. Is it mere parade that induces a Briton to as-

* Marshal Saxe.

sume the appearance of a Soldier? Such would seem to have been the actual case, or a misguided and ignorant notion of the duties of military men. A system thus adopted, whose basis is of the most fragile, the most uncertain and falsest nature, cannot, should not, be depended on. It has been by some supposed a firm resource in the hour of trial: how erroneous such suppositions are, perhaps need not be further expatiated on. True it is that Britons are brave, honorable, and faithful to their king and country; yet it is not the impetuosity of a man fearless of danger, that can be relied upon, but courage tempered by discretion, and well regulated by instruction. If a volunteer system of military defence is ever intended as a measure of internal security, that system cannot be successful in its object unless supported by strict discipline, and its members made alike responsible for their conduct as if they were engaged in the regular service: not as the mere resemblance of soldiers—but men acting under necessary orders and regulations, subject to martial laws; well trained, and expert in the use of arms; respected by, and respecting their officers.

The legislators of Great-Britain could never have imagined that Volunteer Forces, raised and organized as they have hitherto been in this country, would occasion dismay to our enemy. On their first establishment in 1803, the alacrity with which all persons embarked therein, at a moment when political animosities disturbed the whole empire, certainly astonished the ruler of the French nation, and has been generally supposed to have checked his threatened invasion of Great-Britain. It proved to him, that, though divided amongst ourselves, assailed by jacobinism, by the tools of his ambition, and needy adventurers, we were not dead to the salvation of our country; we were alive to our interests when threatened by the machinations of foreign enemies, aided by the efforts of a small but desperate party in the state, and firmly united to oppose all attempts at our subjugation. But, though this sudden national impulse overturned the schemes of the wily Napoleon, he very early perceived, that the force we had raised was a mere system of internal police, and afterwards armed Holiday Bodies, misnamed Volunteer Soldiery.

A further and a main defection in the Volunteer System, is, that the generality of the officers are ignorant of the duties attached to their situations, and consequently incompetent to the important

task of instructing others in a profession of which their own knowledge is so confined. The distinguished author of an Essay on the Military Policy of this country has observed that an army may fail, either from want of discipline; which implies that it is formed of officers and soldiers insubordinate, and ignorant of the common routine of regimental duties; or from being badly organized, in one or in several departments; or from a general want of science in its officers; or lastly, from having at its head a Commander-in-Chief destitute of military talents and of enterprise:—all these evils come under one head; they arise principally, or solely, from bad military institutions.—I have been an eye-witness of instances, and they are by no means uncommon, where privates were much better acquainted with military regulations, duties, and tactics, than their Volunteer Commanders; and when incapacity is apparent in the conduct of those appointed to the superintendence of any particular branch, either of Military or Civil affairs, the natural ambition of those who have to execute the minutiæ and active duties of their offices, must frequently prompt them to an unwilling obedience, and excite a want of confidence. The latter consideration demonstrates the necessity, that in all forces of a like description, the greater part of the officers should be composed of able and distinguished veterans, inured to service, and retaining a competent knowledge and sufficient activity to instruct others, placed under their orders, in the art of war. Under such officers Volunteers might be rendered serviceable as a military body, provided the mutiny act was so far amended as to subject them to all the restrictions and punishments of the profession they voluntarily offer themselves to become members of: without the latter measure, they never can,—they certainly never should have been considered as a permanent and effectual resource to overthrow the attempts of our enemy*.

* Under circumstances of necessity, if every Englishman was called upon to protect his country from an hostile attack, there is not a doubt that they would come forward, animated with that noble and energetic spirit, for which we are so justly celebrated: but that ardour would not be regulated, and, when the safety of a nation is at stake, especially so small a one as Britain, it would be extravagant folly to trust solely to the spirit of the country, when its martial temper might be constituted ten-fold more formidable by being aided with experience in the use of arms and regular discipline. "Calculations made upon the spirit of a nation *without a body*, or upon the body of a people *without a soul*, will always prove

In an investigation of the Volunteer System at a critical moment like the present, when we have to exert every nerve against the energetic efforts of the Tyrant of Mankind, I must not omit remarking, that many of its members are such from compulsion:—they have not embarked therein from motives of patriotism, but on the idea that it will protect them from another species of service. Here then, is an additional cause for the system, if it is allowed to exist, being placed under the controul of the Mutiny Act. When men do not enter a profession from inclination towards it, and a desire by their services to strengthen the defence of their country, but to accommodate their private interests, by attending to their individual concerns, or avocations, without any very serious interruption; surely the little time devoted to military evolutions should be strictly exercised in implicit obedience to orders and discipline. Were I to enquire of a Volunteer, " in what light he considers himself, and by what ties he is bound to his military profession?" he would inform me, " that he is under no military ties—that he has offered his services for the reasons above stated, and that he enjoys the free-will of withholding them at pleasure: that if he has sufficient interest, and calls a committee, any officer, whose conduct may not meet his wishes, is removed, and another appointed who will allow a greater scope for his freedom of action." A mere farce is thus made of soldiery, and I must observe, that it is calculated, in many respects, most seriously to injure the regular service. It holds forth a system of military insubordination, tumult, and

fallacious." Spain and Portugal have presented us with a clear demonstration of the necessity which exists, that all nations in the present times, should be trained to the exercise of arms and military discipline; for, notwithstanding the noble enthusiasm which the people of both those oppressed countries displayed on first discovering the unjust and rapacious designs of Buonaparte, they found themselves incapable of bringing into the field regular forces to contend with him, though their population was adequate to furnish large armies. Discipline, that material foundation for military forces, no where prevailed: that which has been since introduced into the Portuguese ranks by British Officers, has raised the character of their troops to a state of superiority hitherto unknown amongst them. By degrees they have weeded out such of the old school as have been deemed unfit for service, and for the present mode of warfare:—at first supplying their places with intelligent and active British Officers, and encouraging, by promotions, young Portuguese officers:—under this plan the Portuguese army became well officered, not as in former days,—ensigns of forty years of age, but young, intelligent, and active men, qualified for services of hazardous importance. A Military Seminary has also been established at Lisbon, for young gentlemen, that would be an ornament to any country, and does infinite credit both to the understandings and hearts of its projectors.

disaffection, expensive to the state, and dangerous from its licentiousness.—Finally, if volunteers, who are in fact, as already observed, such only from individual advantage, are not to be liable to regular discipline, they should not be exempted from ballots for the militia.

Every change in the ministry of this kingdom has produced a new military system, or a new plan of defensive warfare. Each War-Minister is anxious to introduce his own ideas as to the method of defence which should be adopted, and thus plan after plan is brought forward, and the perfection which may have been attained by perseverance, is overturned by a successor in office substituting his plan. Thus maturity in defensive systems has long been out of the question, and we are ever in the infancy of new schemes, and can never reach perfection in any. To remedy the ruinous waste of public revenue which arises from the introduction of novelties in this most important part of the strength of the county, I have several times respectfully recommended in my remarks on Military Subjects, that a Board of experienced officers should be appointed, before whom the different plans which have been brought forward of late years should be laid, and that they should decide upon those which might appear to them most suitable to the welfare of their country; that a law should then be passed depriving any ministers of the power of deviating from those approved by the General Officers, for a stated period, at least ten years.—On the expiration of that term we should be enabled to judge of its utility, and I have no doubt that the results of such plans would be most satisfactory and beneficial to Great-Britain, especially as they would be approved, and the amendments suggested, by military men, who, we might expect, would consider the subject with that mature and deliberate attention, which it so indispensably demands: and it is but reasonable to presume, that men, whose lives have been passed in the service, are more competent to suggest military arrangements on a judicious and systematic plan than ministers, who, perhaps, are in no ways acquainted with military service.

The system of Local Militias, though at present considered by many as an oppressive taxation on the people, will finally meet with the warmest approbation; but many amendments must be introduced to constitute it effective in its different bearings.—In France, the road to power is the military profession, and circum-

stances may render it the same in this country. Our wish should therefore be, to excite from this source a martial spirit, which is absolutely necessary to be disseminated throughout the empire, a spirit which will make the profession of arms honored and revered by all classes of the community.—Let us consider how this point is to be obtained: 1st, by the personal exertions of those gentlemen holding commissions, to endear, by gentleness in command, the profession to the men: and, 2dly, by maintaining regular discipline without the exercise of improper authority, or harassing the men so as to produce a distaste for military pursuits; and this demands attention from every commanding officer of local militia corps.—The men being held under exactly the same restrictions as those engaged in the regular service of this country, we have every reason to suppose that the system will be finally serviceable, and equal to the objects for which it is designed. In cases of momentary tumult or disaffection in any part of the country, the Local Militia, on being called out, are the most likely engines to quell the disturbances. It is therefore incumbent to make that species of force highly respectable, and at the same time attractive to the nation at large, as occasions may arise when their services will be found of the utmost importance to the support of the laws, and the executive government of the country. This then is a force whereon much reliance may be placed; a force where military ardor may be combined with regularity of discipline, and ability in the use of arms; and consequently it possesses a decided advantage over the volunteer system, which it is to be hoped will soon cease to exist. Though Local Militia regiments are established for the express service of the counties and places in which they are respectively raised, I should certainly recommend, in cases of necessity, where the disturbed state of other counties might render such an object essential, that they should be liable to immediate removal, and service in the adjoining districts, during the time which the state of affairs may require.—A clause of this nature being introduced in the bill, cannot, in my opinion, injure the system, but it may certainly afford additional energy to the executive government.

To assure ourselves, however, of these salutary effects arising from the Local Militia force being placed on a proper footing, strict attention must be observed to the first point I have introduced,

and a complete change made in the discipline of these regiments. As the men balloted for the Local Militia are in general mechanics, and persons employed in agriculture and hard labour, it was expected by many, that the fatigues of one and twenty days manual exercise would not differ materially from that number of days employment in their ordinary avocations. The idea is extremely erroneous.—The stiff positions of soldiers, and the regular manœuvre, are felt by such individuals as extremely irksome; and it being necessary, that pains should be taken to give them an inclination for a military life, these circumstances should be fully considered.—Drills, parades, field-days, marches, counter-marches from morning till night, supporting a firelock, and galled by belts, are sufficient to create a disgust in husbandmen to military pursuits.—I would therefore suggest, that whenever possible, these regiments should be paraded with regiments of the line, and, that their exercise should be at first merely sufficient to instruct them in the regular manœuvre: it would afford to the Local Militia-man an opportunity of observing temperate and regular discipline—the most perfect harmony and good will: officers studying the happiness, comfort, and ease of the men; and they looking up to their officers with regard and respect. A mode of discipline so light, judicious, effectual and unoppressive, would administer to the Local Militia a military ardor, and, according to General Stewart, "will, by degrees, mould the untractable passions of men into habits, in many respects repugnant to the feelings of ordinary life." It would also be very serviceable to the officers, some of whom, from having been in the militia, or unhappily in the line, though but Ensigns or Cornets, perhaps forty years back, harass and disgust their men by unnecessary fatigue. As long as we see and hear of commanding officers drilling the men for six hours together, swearing, scolding, and galloping about the field after their few ideas, and the mens patience exhausted, in being a tool for others to lay their own blunders on, we cannot expect much perfection in the Local Militia, or a military enthusiasm established throughout the country. Besides, the generality of Local Militia officers are ignorant of regular and proper discipline, by which the men are unnecessarily over-drilled; and I must also lament, that the non-commissioned officers add to the dislike which the extreme fatigue occasions.—In general, the latter

are a set of ignorant, blustering coxcombs, without that suavity of manners so necessary to conciliate: and it cannot be supposed, that if the old militia regiments possess any good non-commissioned officers, they will part with them.—Particular attention, it is evident, should be observed by commanding officers to the conduct of the non-commissioned; to the comforts of the men, and to prevent them being unnecessarily drilled: and they should strive to excite an emulation in the minds of all for military pursuits. If they were also made to assemble in large bodies, two or three regiments together, and then exercised under the command of the General, or Inspecting Field-Officer of the district, much benefit might result; and in a very short space of time they would not be inferior to the present regular militia force.

A material imperfection in our military system proceeds, as I have already noticed, from the continual ardent innovation and mad fluctuation we exhibit, in experiments as to modes of defence: thus it is that we have men embodied under various descriptions of soldiery, which create jealousies and divisions in the respective services. The superior advantages one description of troops may command over another, is a matter of debate, of discontent, and cannot fail to produce a want of unanimity when quartered together. At present we have men raised for the following services: —militia, local militia, garrison battalions, guards, dragoons, regulars, fencibles, &c. &c. and men entitled volunteers. The establishments of the above all differ.—In some, engagements are made for limited service, others for unlimited, others not disposable, and others totally unserviceable. Until the whole are converted into a regular and consistent establishment, the military system of Great-Britain cannot be otherwise than imperfect.—There is no difficulty in constituting them alike, and rendering them a disposable force liable to service in all parts of the globe. The expenditure would, by this step, be very considerably reduced, the security of the country greatly augmented, and the military profession would reap considerable benefit.

I will now take into consideration the Regular Militia Force, which although I cannot assert to have been entirely useless, I may very correctly observe, that in the event of the Local Militia Force being brought into complete perfection, the necessity of an indisposable Regular Militia will no longer prevail.—If the internal se-

curity of this isle can be maintained by the Loçal Militia, a Regular Militia of the nature of that now in existence, cannot be otherwise than useless, and an excessive drain on the financial resources of the state. But is there any difficulty in altering the establishment, so as to make it a disposable force? I can find none—and the necessity of carrying on the war in the Peninsula on a more extended scale, will be a strong plea in favor of a measure, which would admit of eighty thousand men joining our brave countrymen in arms, to protect the liberties and independence of two states desolated by oppression.—A plan for the above purpose, suggested by some officers, has fallen into my hands, and it appearing to me that their recommendation, which is in coincidence with my own opinion, could be safely adopted—I shall subjoin an outline thereof, with some additions.

The Militia Force is proposed to be rendered disposable in every part *of Europe for a limited time,* at the expiration of which, to be liable to the same services as regular regiments of the line, and reducible, or otherwise, in time of peace, as circumstances might require.—With regard to regulations in detail they might be divided into two distinct heads: 1st, by an arrangement for the officers; and, 2dly, by an arrangement for the private men.

1st. *Officers.*—Allow them to hold their present rank, or resign, if they do not desire to serve as regulars: all officers of the new establishment, the militia, of the same rank with the present regular force, by acquiring new commissions after a short time, when their services shall become unlimited, rank* with regulars, according to date of commission; but at first every officer of the old regular establishment of the same rank, though his commission should be of later date, should be entitled to precedency. All vacant commissions to be filled up from the regulars; and as far as it might be consistent with the interest of the militia officers, the command of battalions to be given to officers of the old regular force. All colonels, field-officers, and captains, who are qualified to hold commissions in the militia, could have no reason to object to such an arrangement: if they chose to remain in the service, and felt an attachment to the profession of a soldier, they would

* When we hear every day of Captains in the militia eager at an opportunity of becoming subalterns in the line, we may naturally conclude that an arrangement of this kind would be acceptable to the militia officers in general.

hold their rank in a manner very advantageous to them; upon those who chose to resign, it could not be deemed a hardship: having rank, pay, and emolument, equal to that of the regulars, it is but reasonable that they should become subject to the same duties, or resign commissions, according to the tenure of which they are equally burdensome as expensive, and less useful in duty to their country. The officers of the militia would become regulars, with great privileges over the old establishment; they would hold their rank without purchase, without having served abroad, and, in some cases, without great length of service at home, and not subject, at least for a time, to serve on stations out of Europe. Those who are disposed to make the army a profession, would acquire such advantage by this arrangement, that instead of considering it as a hardship, they ought to contribute a certain sum of money in proportion to the rank they would hold, for the purpose of levying men, or granting a bounty to the privates. Old officers, whose commissions do not require a qualification by the actual possession of property, or where the qualification has been disregarded, would, in particular, be highly favoured, by being put upon the regular establishment in their present rank, without having been subject to the expense and service of those who have acquired their situations under innumerable difficulties, to which, as well with regard to property as in other respects, they have been professionally exposed. That so many officers should be brought into the regular army, might appear, at first, an injury to the regulars; but we apprehend, upon a well-contrived, judicious, and impartial distribution of the new commissions, many of which should be given to meritorious officers on half-pay, great benefit would arise to the old and new establishment, as well in point of promotion, as otherwise. Many vacancies would occur from resignations, in addition to those already in existence: and they being filled up from the present permanent army, the new part of the regular establishment would soon become completed. It is also proposed, that every addition to the regular army should be divided into battalions of 500 men, with an effective Colonel appointed to each: such Colonel to receive the usual pay of a Colonel, but without any emolument from clothing: either the 400l. a year, or such other sum as might be directed by parliament in case the pay of the army should be augmented, or any new mode

of distributing pay adopted: and if any of the Colonels of militia, from other avocations, or from the smallness of the pay, which might be attached to the respective commandants of such corps, compared with the emoluments annexed to the command of a militia regiment as it stands at present, should consider such appointments as below their acceptance, there are innumerable officers of the regular line, of thirty or forty years standing, of equal or superior rank, to whom the command of such a battalion would be highly desirable.

I have given, with additions, a more detailed outline of the arrangements proposed for the officers, than I at first intended: but the importance of the proposition, its practicability, and the idea that such an alteration would more nearly affect officers than privates*, must be my excuse. In giving the proposed arrangement for the privates, I shall be more concise.

2d. *Privates.*—Two modes of engagement should be entered upon:—1st. A small bounty to be given to militia-men becoming voluntary regulars. 2d. Those who are unwilling to be drafted into garrison battalions, and serve out their time in the capacity of soldiers, pursuant to the terms of their first engagement in the militia. The voluntary regulars would have an advantage over the present regulars, viz. the advantage of enjoying every former right or privilege—such as a provision for their wives and families, for a certain limited time.

The advantages which might accrue to the service and the

* From the rapidity with which privates in the militia, have, at the different volunteerings, offered their services for the line, I am led to believe that they would not object to this plan, especially as they would be, for the most part, commanded by officers whom they had served under as militia-men.—If militia forces are to be preserved, these occasional volunteerings are highly objectionable, as productive of disgust in militia-officers, who, after perfecting their men in discipline, are deprived of them, and thus their situations become similar to drill-serjeants, and the greater part of their corps, recruits: it has given birth, however, to a conduct in some commanding officers, which is certainly reprehensible, although the measure is objectionable. At the periods of recruiting from the militia, every officer is bound to promote the same, as it is the object of our executive government, yet commanding officers of several militia regiments have contrived to absent, or engage upon particular duties, the grenadiers, light infantry, and best men of their corps, till the time of receiving recruits expired, or until the worst part of their regiments had volunteered: and although numbers of the finest men would have rejoiced in offering their services for the line, they have been prevented by this flagitious conduct on the part of their officers.

country, from rendering the militia a disposable force, have been sufficiently expatiated on, and I conceive, that under some arrangement as the foregoing, the measure may be found practicable.—We should thereby add very largely to the military strength of the empire. On the 25th of December 1811, the regular force of Great-Britain amounted to 218,949 men; the militia to 77,159.—The addition of the latter number to the disposable strength of the country, would enable us to carry into execution our operations in the Peninsula on a far more extended scale than at present, and without adding to the expense already incurred by the support of these two different forces; whereas, under the existing system, our military strength is cramped, in the support of 80,000 militia-men, which prevents youths active and well-adapted for regular service being engaged therein. The Honorable General Stewart has very ably observed in a pamphlet published in 1806, that "Effective and well-disciplined forces are the best; they will ultimately be found the cheapest for every state, and that, without the agency of these, Great-Britain can never be secure at home, command dominion abroad, and, far less, effect that revolution in the political world which may restore Europe to any degree of equilibrium."

On the other class, or description of service, mentioned in the former part of these remarks, I have only to observe, that if a necessity exists for retaining the present mode, the services of all should be rendered alike disposable, or advantages introduced to counterbalance each other. A further imperfection in our military system, and which merits notice, is the enormous bounties given for substitutes in the militia: these are temptations for men to desert—temptations which have frequently seduced those who have been excellent soldiers, but who, perhaps, from some particular calamity, having their wives and children in distress, rather than see them perish, desert, and again receive the bounty of a substitute. It is an admitted fact, that some men receive three and four bounties: they can obtain them without endangering their lives. These temptations are also detrimental to the recruiting service.

A standing army has always been considered by the people of Great-Britain as an unconstitutional measure, and likely to subvert their liberties.—This reasoning, whether fallacious, or otherwise, must give way to the necessity of the times, the critical state of Europe, the machinations and intrigues of our enemy, and the

armed population of nearly the whole Continent; which plainly indicate, that Great-Britain, to maintain her independence abroad, her internal security at home, and even her existence as a nation, must be supported by such a force, and not solely rely on the security which her naval superiority promises. In peace, a commercial nation may not require that military character which at present is so absolutely demanded; but there is little appearance of foreign and domestic security being, for a long time to come, maintained without the aid of well-regulated troops.—The first of these objects may be materially aided by the conversion of the militia into a disposable force, and the latter will be fully accomplished, by constituting the Local Militia regiments equal to the grand design for which they were first raised.

It may be a wrong impression to suppose that a standing army is subversive of the liberties of this country, for we find that those states which were considered by the ancients as the most free and independent, maintained such forces even during the time of peace, and that they at the same time protected the liberties and independence of the people, by keeping in awe other states. The condition of Great-Britain is not different: she is threatened; every point is exerted to injure her security, and to promote internal dissentions, which the art of an ambitious and powerful enemy can invent.—Are there other means of resisting such measures, or preserving our sacred liberties, than by the maintenance of a formidable force, and implanting throughout the kingdom military ardor, under the controul of military laws?

However formidable the military resources of the French empire may be, and great they certainly are*, for according to Mr. Adam Smith, "in France, a revenue of thirty millions might be levied for the support of the state, with as little inconveniency as a revenue of ten millions in Great-Britain," nevertheless, England possesses powers, which, if called into action, will be found equal to the support of her independence, to the extension of her character as a

* The natural advantages enjoyed by France, give to that country an advantage of 20 per cent. at least, over any other part of Europe of equal size and population: that is to say, when any state in Europe, the most favored by nature, possessing, we will suppose, ten millions of inhabitants, can maintain a standing army, or military establishment of 200,000 men, an equal portion of the population of France can with the same facility, and at the same expense, maintain 240,000 men." Estimate of the Strength of France and Russia.

military nation, and to aid weaker states: that if she is not lulled by a false security, or an absurd infatuation in the maintenance of forces, which only furnish wrong and idle expectation, and should constitute her military system in a manner congenial to the best and dearest interests of the British empire, she may bid defiance to the whole world: "True courage, and true wisdom, consist alone in calculating danger in its utmost extent, in foreseeing and preparing for the worst that may happen. They are equally removed from that rash and presumptuous infatuation, which either cannot see, or under-rate the evils that menace us; and from that wilful blindness, proceeding from real despondency, which makes weak minds shrink from the consideration of future perils, and, as it were, refuse to think upon them; both of which dispositions, whether influencing individuals, or nations, equally lead to their certain destruction*." Having the inclination, we fortunately enjoy the power to give aid to oppressed states, for the recovery of their rights, and in avenging their injuries.—Although the population of France, as estimated by the late Mr. Windham, admits of six millions of men capable to carry arms; and of these, two millions and a half are between eighteen and twenty-three, yet, the strength of Great-Britain, aided by her insular situation, will ever, if properly employed, give her not only security, but the power of contributing to the protection of others. The army and navy of Great-Britain have together increased 169,902, since 1801, and the male population, during the last eleven years, has been augmented by 851,256. It cannot be asserted, notwithstanding the numerous inclosures, that a greater number of men are required for tillage and manufactures than was in 1801; when the improvements in machinery of all kinds are considered, by which the labour of at least twelve men is performed by one.—Here then is a surplus of 681,354 male children, and consequently, at least, as great an additional number of men capable of bearing arms. The average of casualties in the army is about 23,300 annually; and I therefore with confidence assert, that an additional force of 50,000 men might be raised for service, and kept up during the war, without injury either to the agriculture or manufacturing interest of the country.—I admit that the support of such a force

* Pasley on the Military Policy, &c.

will require no inconsiderable sum, about 150,000l*.—It must, at the same time be admitted, that the distressed condition of the lower orders throughout Great-Britain, may oblige the country to the adoption of some step for their support: and would it not be more adviseable to make their services useful in opposing the measures of our enemy, than in continuing them as paupers, and burthensome to the state.—Nothing, then, but energy and a correction of her military system, are required in Great-Britain to enable her to carry into action her vast resources; when she may unfurl the banner of freedom on the Continent,—" send forth our armies to fight the enemy on the banks of the Ebro, the Elbe, or the Loire; plant the British flag on the mountains of Sicily, on the Appenines, or on the plains of Champagne;" effectually strike at the root of Napoleon's ambition, give peace to Europe, tranquillity to the universe.—To act merely on the defensive, at a time when a convulsive struggle might produce such happiness for those states now in bondage and severely oppressed, would argue a timid policy, disgraceful to our national character;—but, moreover, our own preservation demands this step. In an Historical Survey of the Foreign Affairs of Great-Britain, by Mr. Leckie, is a judicious remark, " that a stationary power cannot possibly resist an increasing one; and that it is, therefore, right for a nation, in our present situation, to conquer from a principle of self-preservation." France possesses the advantage of a large revenue †, of a great population;—her frontiers are rendered strong by the subjugation of her neighbours, but most of these advantages would be removed if the subjugated powers were freed from their present yoke. A well equipped British force of 100,000 men, landed on the Continent, would raise the debased spirit of foreign powers,—would be supported by myriads of oppressed beings ready to avail themselves of the means offered them to regain their independence,—to give security to their native homes. It must not be said that such a force cannot be produced;—look to the statement, whence 50,000 are shewn to be readily levied; add to that number the 80,000 Militia-men, and a force of 130,000 men are at our command. But if it is not deemed expedient to employ them as above pointed out,

* A statement founded on the Army Estimates of this year.

† The public revenue, independent of colonies and foreign trade, is 48,000,000l. sterling and upwards;—a sum equal to, if not exceeding, the unencumbered part of the revenues of all the independent governments of Europe.

let us turn our views to the affairs in the Peninsula. On this day, the 18th of November, the Gazette contains dispatches from the Marquis of Wellington, stating that on the night of the 20th ult. his limited means obliged him to raise the siege of Burgos,—that "he felt severely the sacrifice he was thereby obliged to make,"—that "our means were limited," &c. &c. :—of what infinite service would 130,000 men be to the gallant and illustrious Marquis,—of what service to millions of Spaniards and Portuguese; and the restoration of those countries to independence would effect on the Continent a glorious struggle which we must all desire.—It is not by feeble measures that we must expect to attain great objects, but from rigorous efforts on a scale worthy of the character and equal to the strength of the country ;—by half measures and inert conduct are gradually destroyed the resources of the nation; whilst energy, on the part of those who have the direction of our national affairs, might give us a preponderance in the councils of Europe. "It is no economy, either of money or of lives, to make war by driblets."

The existence of France as a military nation, must be generally known to depend on the subjugation* of all the continental powers. The most certain method of overturning and wresting from her iron grasp, from her colossal power, the spoils and conquests of tyranny and ambition, is to establish an independence in different states, which shall not only alarm, but crush the viper. The divisions created by Napoleon, among the continental states, have presented to his kingdom a military command over the greater number of European Governments; and the military strength of the Continent is now seated in his and the armies of the Emperor of Russia †.

* "We consider the real system of the French Government to be neither more nor less than, *an universal ascendancy raised upon natural sources sufficient to maintain a preponderant power*."

ESTIMATES OF THE STRENGTH OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

† "The population of the Russian Empire, exclusive of Georgia, amounts, by the latest enumeration, to about 42 millions; whereof there are upwards of 20 millions of male peasants, 700,000 enrolled soldiers, and 50,000 servants for the Staff; and 1,200,000 free people of all descriptions. The military strength of all states must be estimated by the proportion which those employed in productive labour bear to those who are not: in a country where agriculture occupies all the industry of the nation, there are few idlers; a greater proportion of the inhabitants may, therefore, without inconvenience to the whole, be maintained in the service of

Unless we bring into active operation our dormant resources, and aim to overwhelm the ruler of the French nation, our only remaining object is to prevent, by diversions and armaments, the whole Continent falling under his immediate controul. Should he attain that design of his insatiable ambition, all his attention will be turned to the completion of a navy of sufficient strength to overwhelm ours*; and it is impossible for Great-Britain to build ships with that rapidity which his numberless ports and vast means will then allow to him. "The time is arrived, or is rapidly approaching, in which we may find that our warlike and ambitious views, if confined to the ocean alone, will not be able to protect us; that our system of warding off our adversary's blows, and screening ourselves behind our wooden walls, will no longer save us from destruction; that, like other great nations which have preceded us on the theatre of the universe, we must become a warlike people by land as well as by sea; that we must, in short, conquer upon both elements, or in all human probability we shall, on both, be conquered †." Here it is fit that I observe the regret we have to entertain, that the ruinous state of our harbours does not excite the more serious attention of the legislature. The continual collection of sand in the ports on our Southern and Eastern coasts, and our not being provided with a sufficiency of others, is a prospect far from satisfactory to a Briton's imagination.

I must particularly notice the very great inconvenience and continued heavy losses which, during many years, have arisen from the want of a harbour between Spithead and the Downs, and which has induced, at different periods, the sufferers and other individuals to promote plans to obviate the frequency of great loss and mischief to the coasting vessels, and to afford safety to the shipping that frequent the British Channel. Through the exertions of some dis-

the state, or in military exercise, than there can be in mercantile and manufacturing countries. Those who live by trade or traffic, and refined manufactures, are not only themselves unprofitable consumers, but their subsistence and gains are taxes and burdens on the industry and consumption of others."

* "To rely upon the superior address and bravery of our generous and noble seamen is criminal; others may learn address, and despotism drive them to the fight;—but we must provide effectual and lasting sources to maintain a sufficiency of men who fight for glory to a grateful country and for a beloved king."

ESTIMATES, &c.

† Major Pasley's Essay, &c.

tinguished characters, several very skilful men belonging to His Majesty's Navy, and others, have been employed to survey the coast, and all of them have reported most favourably as to the practicability of forming a good harbour at Newhaven, a situation between the Downs and Portsmouth, which enjoys greater natural advantages than the opposite ports of France and Flanders,—and is contiguous to populous and commercial towns. The plans, however, were upon too limited a scale to be of that great public advantage which it appears, by the opinion of the best judges, can, from the bold coast of Newhaven, be afforded for the safety of commercial shipping as well as His Majesty's cruizers; and it is one of the best and most central in the country for the establishment of an army depôt and for the embarkation of troops. In the beginning of the year 1805, Lord Melville, then First Lord of the Admiralty, knowing such a harbour was greatly wanted, and would be highly desirable if even constructed at a very large expense, ordered Lt. Murray, a Naval Engineer, in a small sloop to survey the coast of Sussex, who was occupied the whole summer in that object, but his Lordship resigned his situation at the Admiralty before the above officer made his report, which was very favorable, but nothing was done, in consequence thereof. The great losses that have been suffered ever since that period by shipwrecks and captures there, and on the neighbouring coast, have urged a number of individuals to take into serious consideration the practicability of forming such a harbour as would give protection, both from the weather and the enemy, to the shipping that frequent the channel, and particularly to the coast of Newhaven, which it is found cannot be protected by the occasional cruizing of armed vessels.—A meeting was convened for this purpose, and it appearing, from the Survey of Lieutenant Murray, that great public advantages might be derived from a more enlarged plan, a subscription was entered upon, and resolutions passed, to employ Mr. Rennie to survey, and form a plan of the harbour and adjoining coast of Newhaven,—which he executed with care and accuracy, and made a highly-favorable report. An opinion of Captain Sproule on the same subject, as also a report of Captain Bolton's to Lord Melville, both officers of the Royal Navy, and who have served a considerable time on the coast of Newhaven; and one by Mr. Creasy, a person of great practical knowledge, who had visited the principal

harbours in the several quarters of the world, in addition to Lieut. Murray's before alluded to,—are alike favorable to the establishment of a grand and capacious harbour on the coast of Newhaven. A memorial of the merchants, ship-owners, and principal inhabitants of the district round Newhaven, proves that great mischief arises from want of a proper port for armed vessels:—that ships are often embayed between Selsey Point and Beachy Head, and cannot round the latter;—that the coast has been almost daily insulted, and that the trade experiences great inconvenience from the enemy's privateers sculking under cover of Beachy Head in hazy weather, and cruizing off this port,—the effects of which have been severely felt by ships homewards bound from foreign ports, several of which latter description have even lately been taken, or driven on shore to prevent capture,—and that this is, from its situation, powerful back water, and other advantages, the only port between Portsmouth and the Downs capable of being made a sufficient harbour for the reception of vessels of considerable size, and is the most central situation for His Majesty's cruizers, and all other purposes.

The public utility of such an undertaking ought to operate as a stimulus for the exertions of all ship-owners, merchants, and others interested in the trade, navigation, and prosperity of the kingdom, in carrying a plan of this nature into execution;—and I hope the efforts of a few patriotic individuals will not be baffled from the want of a general and necessary support.

Northfleet is also a good situation for this object:—in short, when we consider that such harbours as Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, and Ostend, have been formed by our enemy on coasts in general flat and foul, and, therefore, labouring under extraordinary natural disadvantages; and that in many parts we possess a bold coast, and every requisite in nature for forming noble and capacious harbours, we must be surprised at our remissness and inert conduct in a matter of such vast national importance.

Another circumstance to be very much lamented, is the inattention which our ancestors have shewn to the growth of naval timber, and which is daily becoming an article of the greatest scarcity. Of late years it has been the ambition of the landed interest of this country, to lay out a part of their estates solely for that purpose: they cannot expect to reap the benefits of their laudable conduct further than the gratifying satisfaction which

must arise in their breasts, of having disposed of their property in a manner which may prove profitable to their successors, and, at the same time, advantageous to their country. A century hence this nation will find itself highly indebted to such individuals, if, at that time, it exists as a free and independent kingdom, and to maintain the latter, in the words of Mr. Windham, " rather than risk the possibility of ever being obliged to acknowledge a superior on earth —our last shilling,—the moveable property of the empire,—the national debt,—and, if necessary, the blood of our darling children, must be to Britons no consideration."

I have been more diffuse than was my intention on commencing these remarks, and have entered on subjects perhaps extraneous to those I set out with, but on none, I hope, uninteresting to military men. In conclusion I must make one further observation on an important point of the British service ;—*viz.* no provision being afforded to officers who have passed their best days in the honorable profession of arms. To see an old officer,—a veteran,—an honorable and upright character, deprived of the comforts and perhaps necessaries of life, is a sight painful and distressing. That lamented Statesman*, whose sentiments I have before had occasion to introduce, and whose honorable heart and generous feeling towards the army were at all times evinced, made an observation on this interesting point, which I cannot avoid rendering more public :— " To see British Officers, grown grey in the service of their country, obliged to leave it, and to languish out the remainder of their days in exile abroad for trifling debts, contracted perhaps for a necessary subsistence, which their scanty pay refused, is extremely distressing to a liberal mind." Truly correct was the patron of genius, honor, and the distinguished member of society, in the above remark. Daily instances occur of this nature, but their existence will now be of short duration. An illustrious Commander-in-Chief, devoting his life to benefit the condition of the soldier and officer ;—to exalt the military character of the country ;—and, by well-digested regulations, framed on a basis of liberality and foresight, with a view, not only to ameliorate the condition of the British soldier on service, but also in a particular manner conducive to the perfection of military discipline :—so judicious and noble a

* Mr. Windham.

Ruler at the head of the army, cannot fail in shortly providing for the comforts of the grey-headed veteran officer,—and in having afforded to him, that which may render the decline of life smooth and unruffled by the deprivation of necessaries which old age absolutely requires, and which certainly should not be refused to him whose life has been passed in his country's defence. J. P.

London, November 18th, 1812.

REVIEW.

The Regimental Companion; containing the Pay, Allowances, and relative Duties of every Officer in the British Service. By Charles James, Major in the Royal Artillery Drivers.—3 *vols.* 12*mo.*

IN our last number we noticed Major James's new edition of the Military Dictionary, and the task of paying a just tribute to those, who possessing literary talents, devote them to the instruction of their brother officers, is again afforded us in reviewing this work.

The Regimental Companion contains those Army Regulations, and General Orders, which have been issued for the government of the conduct both of officers and privates.—From the arrangement Major James has given them, and the occasional explanatory notes which he has interspersed throughout the work, officers may ascertain with great facility, the many important duties of their profession.—The notes are fully calculated to explain those military points and regulations, which, from the variety of orders which have been issued by the different military departments on the same subject, and frequently in contradiction of each other, are frequently very obscure, and apt to mislead officers, more particularly such as have reference to the financial department of the army.

In this performance, a very clear account is furnished of the Staff of the British army, including the Commissarial, Medical, and Agency Departments, with the different instructions relating to each branch; and the general compilation of this work exhibits that high degree of ability, attention to order and energy, which have always shone a most conspicuous feature in the literary labors of Major James.

THE VISION OF DON RODERICK.

FOR the gratification of our Military Friends we insert the following "Introduction to the Poem of Don Roderick," which although the least finished of Walter Scott's productions, yet is full of interest, and abounds in pleasing imagery. The opening scene, where Don Roderick, in the ancient church of Toledo, is represented as upon the point of reading the future destinies of the Spanish monarchy, and the usurpation of Napoleon,—with the state of the country at this period of time, are all sketched by the hand of a master. But Mr. Scott has been eminently successful in that part of his poem in which he speaks of the British landing in the Peninsula;—the character and composition of the troops are finely drawn, and the whole of these stanzas do honor to the poet. It may not be generally known that the profits arising from the sale of this poem, were devoted, by the Author, to the humane purpose of relieving the Portuguese who had suffered by the invasion of the French under Marshal Massena, in 1810. Hence the edge of criticism is disarmed, and, as the Vision of Don Roderick was written for such an object, and Mr. Scott was limited in point of time,—we in vain look for those beauties which are to be expected in the announced poem of "Rokeby." From what we have heard of the latter work, we conceive that it will be read with equal interest in the camp as in the retirement of the closet; and will doubtless prove, on perusal, that the wings of the muse of Caledonia are *still tipped with living flame.* We eagerly anticipate the publication of "Rokeby," as Mr. Scott's most finished and brilliant production, abounding with incident, and powerfully interesting situations. The scene is laid in the Western parts of Yorkshire, and towards Rokeby Castle on the Greta river,—and the period of action is during the civil wars, previous to the usurpation of Cromwell.

INTRODUCTION.

Lives there a strain, whose sounds of mounting fire
  May rise distinguish'd o'er the din of war,
Or died it with yon master of the Lyre,
  Who sung beleaguer'd Ilion's evil star?

Such, WELLINGTON, might reach thee from afar,
Wafting its descant wide o'er Ocean's range;
Nor shouts, nor clashing arms its mood could mar,
All as it swell'd 'twixt each loud trumpet-change,
That clangs to Britain victory, to Portugal revenge!

Yes! such a strain, with all o'erpowering measure,
Might melodize with each tumultuous sound,
Each voice of fear or triumph, woe or pleasure,
That rings Mondego's ravaged shores around;
The thundering cry of hosts with conquest crown'd,
The female shriek, the ruin'd peasant's moan,
The shout of captives from their chains unbound,
The foil'd oppressor's deep and sullen groan,
A Nation's choral hymn for tyranny o'erthrown.

But we, weak minstrels of a laggard day,
Skill'd but to imitate an elder page,
Timid and raptureless, can we repay
The debt thou claim'st in this exhausted age?
Thou givest our lyres a theme, that might engage
Those that could send thy name o'er sea and land,
Whilst sea and land shall last; for Homer's rage
A theme; a theme for Milton's mighty hand—
How much unmeet for us, a faint degenerate band!

Ye mountains stern! within whose rugged breast,
The friends of Scottish freedom found repose;
Ye torrents! whose hoarse sounds have soothed their rest,
Returning from the field of vanquish'd foes;
Say, have ye lost each wild majestic close,
That erst the choir of bards or druids flung,
What time their hymn of victory arose,
And Cattraeth's glens with voice of triumph rung,
And mystic Merlin harp'd, and grey-hair'd Llywarch sung.

O! if your wilds such minstrelsy retain,
As sure your changeful gales seem oft to say,
When sweeping wild and sinking soft again,
Like trumpet-jubilee, or harp's wild sway;

If ye can echo such triumphant lay,
Then lend the note to him has loved you long!
Who pious gather'd each tradition grey,
That floats your solitary wastes along,
And with affection vain gave them new voice in song.

For not till now, how oft so'er the task
Of truant verse hath lighten'd graver care,
From muse or sylvan was he wont to ask,
In phrase poetic, inspiration fair;
Careless he gave his numbers to the air,—
They came unsought for, if applauses came;
Nor for himself prefers he now the prayer;
Let but his verse befit a hero's fame,
Immortal be the verse!—forgot the poet's name.

Hark, from yon misty cairn their answer tost:
" Minstrel! the fame of whose romantic lyre,
Capricious swelling now, may soon be lost,
Like the light flickering of a cottage fire;
If to such task presumptuous thou aspire,
Seek not from us the meed to warrior due:
Age after age has gather'd son to sire,
Since our grey cliffs the din of conflict knew,
Or, pealing through our vales, victorious bugles blew.

" Decayed our old traditionary lore,
Save where the lingering fays renew their ring,
By milk-maid seen beneath the hawthorn hoar,
Or round the marge of Minchmore's haunted spring;
Save where their legends gray-hair'd shepherds sing,
That now scarce win a listening ear but thine,
Of feuds obscure, and border ravaging,
And rugged deeds recount in rugged line,
Of moonlight foray made on Teviot, Tweed, or Tyne.

" No! search romantic lands, where the near Sun
Gives with unstinted boon ethereal flame,—
Where the rude villager, his labour done,
In verse spontaneous chaunts some favour'd name;

Whether Olalia's charms his tribute claim,
  Her eye of diamond, and her locks of jet;
Or whether, kindling at the deeds of Græme,
  He sing, to wild Morisco measure set,
Old Albin's red claymore, green Erin's bayonet!

" Explore those regions, where the flinty crest
  Of wild Nevada ever gleams with snows,
Where in the Proud Alhambra's ruin'd breast
  Barbaric monuments of pomp repose;
Or where the banners of more ruthless foes
  Than the fierce Moor, float o'er Toledo's fane,
From whose tall towers even now the patriot throws
  An anxious glance, to spy upon the plain
The blended ranks of England, Portugal, and Spain.

" There, of Numantian fire a swarthy spark
  Still lightens in the sun-burnt native's eye;
The stately port, slow step, and visage dark,
  Still mark enduring pride and constancy.
And, if the glow of feudal chivalry
  Beam not, as once, thy nobles' dearest pride,
Iberia! oft thy crestless peasantry
  Have seen the plumed Hidalgo quit their side,
Have seen, yet dauntless stood—'gainst fortune fought and died.

" And cherished still by that unchanging race,
  Are themes for minstrelsy more high than thine,
Of strange tradition many a mystic trace,
  Legend and vision, prophecy and sign;
Where wonders wild of Arabesque combine
  With Gothic imagery of darker shade,
Forming a model meet for minstrel line.
  Go, seek such theme!"—the Mountain Spirit said:
With filial awe I heard—I heard, and I obeyed.

(To be continued.)

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MILITARY PANORAMA.

Sir,

THE Cossacks form so important a part of theRussian Military Forces, and have distinguished themselves so much during the present Campaign, by harassing the French army in their shameful and disastrous retreat from Moscow, that the following short account of them will, I trust, be acceptable to most of your readers. It is taken from a foreign work of merit, entitled "*Russland unter Alexander dem ersten*," published by H. Storch, in the form of a Journal, as a supplement to his "Statistical Account of the Russian Empire." Should this article meet with a favorable reception, I shall be induced to send you some others, perhaps more valuable and important AMICUS.

Dec. 4, 1812.

I. COSSACKS OF THE BUG.

These Cossacks were formed in the year 1769, from a regiment which the Ottoman Porte raised during the war against Russia from among the Christian tribes who inhabit Moldavia, Wallachia, and some districts on the Danube.

Instead of fighting against Russia, these people soon quitted the Turkish army and offered their services to Field-Marshal Count Romanzoff Sadunaiskoi, who at that time was with the Russian army at Chotyn:—their offer was accepted, and they continued to serve during the whole war, without any pay or remuneration whatever.

At the end of the war, lands were assigned to them for a settlement, on the river Bug; and they were promised exemption, for thirty years, from every kind of tax or impost.—They retired thither with their families and property; and another Cossack regiment formed during the same war, from free people and foreigners of all kinds, was established in their neighbourhood, and allowed the same privileges.

In the year 1783 they were again called into service, by Field-Marshal Prince Potemkin, and during the campaign formed a cordon along the Bug.

After this they had a share in all the campaigns against the Turks, and, besides other services, were employed against the Poles,

and for covering the frontiers along the Dniester, and the shores of the Black Sea. They were, however, neither disciplined, nor did they receive maintenance, or any pay for their service, till the year 1796, when the Empress Catharine II. gave orders that this corps of Cossacks should be formally admitted into the Russian army; that an addition of 3726 men should be made to it; that the proper quantity of land should be assigned to the individuals who composed it; and that the corps should be regularly organized, and the officers rewarded by rank and promotion.

In consequence of the death of the empress, which took place soon after, these measures were not carried into execution. The Emperor Paul ordered these Cossacks to quit the military service, and to place themselves on the footing of government boors; and in this situation they actually remained till the year 1801, when, in consequence of a petition which they caused to be presented to the Emperor, they were restored, by an ukas dated May 5th, 1804, to their former condition, and received a civil as well as a military organization.

They are divided into three regiments, each consisting of 500 men, under a common Attaman, or Commander-in-Chief. Each regiment has 1 colonel with the rank of major; 5 yessaule with the rank of captain; 5 sotniki and 5 chorunschiy with the rank of lieutenant; 1 quarter-master with the rank of quarter-master in the army; one clerk; and 483 men, subalterns and privates.

Officers and commanders must be chosen from the corps, and none can be appointed to that rank but such as have long served in it, and distinguished themselves by their good conduct.

Of the three regiments, two commonly remain at home; the third performs service on the frontiers; but they are all three bound to take the field in case their assistance should be necessary.

As soon as these Cossacks enter into actual service, on the frontiers, or in the field, they obtain from government maintenance and rations like the hussar regiments; but these cease as soon as they return to their homes.

The internal and civil affairs of this corps are committed to a peculiar tribunal, (*Voiskovaia Kantzelariyà*) which consists of two permanent members, and two elected every three years, with the Attaman as president.—All these members are chosen by the corps, from among themselves, and confirmed by government.

From the decisions of this tribunal there is no appeal.—Criminal affairs belong to the Courts of the district, established for the purpose.

These Cossacks are permitted to take as recruits Wallachians, Moldavians, Bulgarians, &c. but they are strictly forbidden to entice Russian peasants to join them.—Like all the other classes in the kingdom, each individual, independently of the general right of the whole body, has a private right to purchase land and other property. In case the land which they hold in common be found too confined, they are authorized to take possession of a part, or if circumstances require it, of all the waste lands between the Bug and the Ingul.

This corps in the year 1805 amounted to 6383 men, who occupied a considerable tract of land in the neighbourhood of Elizabethgrad, Cherson, and Olwiopol.

II. Tschuguyef Cossacks.

The Tschuguyef Cossacks, in consequence of their own request, obtained a similar civil organization in the year 1803.

A regiment, consisting of 10 squadrons, with officers similar to those usual among the other Cossacks, has been formed of them; and the officers enjoy the same rank as those among the Cossacks of the Bug.—Like these, they perform service in turns, and they receive maintenance and provisions only when they march to the distance of more than 100 wersts* from their home.—Like all the other Cossacks they are obliged to join the regiment when a vacancy takes place, completely mounted and equipped.

These Cossacks, including the *adnodvortzy*, or peasants, which formerly belonged to the convents, &c. amounted to 22,007 men; of these, however, 14,361 expressed a wish of again entering the condition of crown peasants: this was granted them, and in 1805 they amounted to only 7,646 men.

Their principal residence is the town of Tschuguyef, with the surrounding district; but lands of considerable extent, fit both for pasturage and agriculture, have been assigned to them in the Schirogan Steppe, and the northern Donez.

* A werst is about three quarters of a mile English.

III. Cossacks of the Don.

The Cossacks of the Don consist of 66,941 individuals fit for service, above the age of seventeen; 46,612 children of officers and other Cossacks from the age of 1 to 17; 2,142 officers and generals; to whom must be added 6,050 unbaptized Tartars *(inovertzy)* and Calmucks; and 68,540 boors assigned to them: forming altogether 190,285 males, who, besides the Cossack capital, Tscherkask, reside in 111 separate hamlets and villages *(stanitzy.)*

The whole military corps is divided into 80 regiments, each of 500 men.—Besides a common Attaman, these regiments have their separate Colonels and officers, who enjoy the same rank and privileges as those of the other Cossacks, and who must all take the field properly equipped and well mounted. This organization and division into regiments exist only during the time they are in the field; when they return home, the whole establishment ceases, and they all revert to the state of boors, except a few who remain as guards, and to support the internal police of the country.

The capital of this tribe, where the Attaman and other members reside, is Tscherkask, a neat town on the Don.—This tribe of Cossacks, the most numerous and most important of all, are distinguished from the rest by greater civilization and industry.—They apply to agriculture, as well as to the breeding of horses, cattle, and sheep; they cultivate also the vine, and have already carried this branch of rural economy to a considerable degree of perfection: the wine in particular made in the neighbourhood of Zymlansk and Rasdorsk, is peculiarly well-tasted.

IV. The Tschernomorski, formerly the Saporagian Cossacks.

These Cossacks, which obtained a new administration along with all the preceding, amount, since the reform introduced by the Empress Catharine II. in 1775, to about 25,000, which number, in extraordinary cases, can send into the field 15,000 warriors.—For common service, six regiments, each consisting of 578 men, have been organized with officers, who enjoy the same rank and privileges as those of the other Cossacks.

V. The Uralian Cossacks.

This tribe, formerly called the Yaick Cossacks, are divided, according to the new regulation of 1803, into ten irregular regi-

ments, each of which, officers included, consists of 578 men. The officers enjoy the same rank and privileges as the preceding.

These Cossacks have a civil establishment, like those already mentioned, under the direction of an Attaman, who resides in Uralsk, a town of considerable size, from which the possessions of this tribe extend along the right bank of the river Ural, as far as the Caspian Sea.

They amount to about 30,000, among whom there are a great many baptized Tartars, and also Calmucks, who have entered their names as Cossacks. On extraordinary occasions they can send into the field from 18 to 20,000 men.

In consequence of the situation of their lands on the rivers Ural and Ilek, and even on the shores of the Caspian Sea, all of which abound with fish, these people, besides breeding horses and cattle, apply much to fishing, and other branches of industry arising from that occupation.—They carry on a great trade with dried fish of every kind; and the Uralian caviar is generally considered as the best.

The four Cossack tribes last mentioned, receive, like those of the Bug, maintenance and provisions when they serve at the distance of more than 100 wersts from their home.

Calmucks of Stawropol.

Among the irregular troops of the Russian empire which, under the present reign, have received a new organization, may be classed the Calmucks of Stawropol, whose possessions are situated on the rivers Samara, Sok, and Tok, in the governments of Simbirsk and Orenburg, and whose chief residence is the town of Stawropol, on the Wolga.

The foundation of this considerable tribe was laid in the year 1716, by a Taisch, or leader of the great horde of the Astracan Calmucks, who, with all his vassals, passed into Russia, where he and his followers settled, and embraced the Christian religion.—On this occasion Peter I. attended the Taisch, and gave him his own name.

After the death of the Taisch, in 1737, the Empress Anne conferred on his widow the title of princess, and settled upon her an annual pension for her support.—At the same time the government of these Calmucks was assigned to her, in conjunction with

the commandant of the fortress of Stawropol, which had been built the same year.

In 1745 these Calmucks obtained, through the senate, a kind of organization, being divided into 8 troops, of 300 men each, who were to hold themselves in readiness for military service.

In 1760 their number was increased by the Soongari Calmucks, who, in 1765, embraced the Christian religion, and were divided also into 3 troops; so that the whole tribe at present consists of 11 troops; all these together in 1805 contained 2869 men, capable of bearing arms, of whom, however, no more than from 4 to 600 were bound to take the field.

In 1803 these Calmucks obtained a new organization, similar to that of the Cossacks already mentioned.—At present they form one regiment of 1000 men, under the command of an Attaman, and other officers, who have the same rank as those of the Cossacks.—Of this regiment, one half only, in general, is employed in actual service, the other remaining at home. On extraordinary occasions the Attaman is obliged to take the field with the whole regiment; and in this case, the garrisons and other posts are guarded by the remaining Calmucks, who do not properly belong to the regiment.

The Calmucks, like the Cossacks, are obliged to enter the regiment completely mounted and equipped.—They receive pay and provisions only when they serve at the distance of more than 100 wersts from their home.

The Stawropol Calmucks have been employed only in the wars with Prussia and Sweden; but their most important use is to maintain the cordon on the frontiers against the Kirgîsians, Raisaks, and Mountaineers; a service for which, in consequence of their agility and simple mode of life, they are much better fitted than regular troops.

CAMPAIGNS

IN

THE PENINSULA.

Continued from page 233.

SUCH were the plans dictated by the wise and liberal policy of the British ministry for affording the most effectual aid to the Spanish patriots. Their recent successes and the spirit which seemed to animate the whole nation against its pefidious invader, as displayed in the heroic defence of Saragossa, by General Palafox, together with the surrender of Dupont's army at Baylen, to the forces under Generals Castanos and Reding, appeared to warrant every exertion that could be made by Great-Britain in their favor.

Sir John Moore, having received the final instructions of his court, busied himself in preparations for the advance of the army under his command, into Spain, and on the 27th of October he quitted Lisbon, the whole of his troops having previously marched in three columns, and by different routes. The right column, under the command of General Hope, consisting of the cavalry and artillery, with four regiments of infantry, proceeded by Elvas and Badajos, on the high road to Madrid; and two brigades, under Major-General the Honorable Edward Paget, by Elvas and Alcantara:—the rest of the army moved through Almeida;—two brigades under Major-General Beresford, by way of Coimbra;—those under Lieutenant-General Fraser, took the route of Abrantes. These troops were to unite at Salamanca, which was fixed upon as the point for the whole army to concentrate. Head-quarters, and the Medical Staff proceeded by the central route.

It was not without extreme reluctance, and a conviction in the necessity of the measure, that Sir John Moore consented to a separation of his troops, and to their proceeding by different routes into Spain. When the advance from Lisbon was decided upon, a number of obstacles appeared. The Spanish Commissary General was consulted concerning the means of subsisting the army on the great road by Elvas; but when the quantity of meat required was

explained to him, he computed that in three months all the oxen would be consumed, and very few hogs left in the country. In the North of Portugal there was abundance of cattle and other provision, but the Portuguese declared that the mountains could not be passed over by artillery, and the British officers, who were sent to examine the roads, coincided in this opinion. When Sir John Moore was already on march, it was discovered that the roads, bad as they were, might be easily rendered practicable for the cannon,—and this late discovery occasioned considerable chagrin to the Commander of the Forces.

Sir John Moore, being thoroughly acquainted with the character of his countrymen, warned the troops, in general orders, previous to the commencement of his march, that the Spaniards were a grave, orderly people,—extremely sober,—but generous and warm in their temper, and easily offended by any insult or disrespect which was offered them;—and he endeavoured to impress upon their minds the propriety of accommodating themselves to these manners, —and not shocking, by their intemperance, a high-minded nation, who were grateful to the British, and worthy of being their allies. Respecting the sick, he said, that he observed, with much concern, their numbers were daily increasing,—it was owing, in a great degree, to their own intemperance, that so many of them were rendered incapable of marching against the enemy; and, having stated this, he felt confident that he need say no more to British soldiers to ensure their sobriety. It had been attempted to prevent the soldiers indulging to excess in Lisbon, by posting sentries over the wine-houses, but this precaution, and the excellent regulations issued by the Commander of the Forces, appear to have been disregarded by the troops, amongst whom a considerable sickness prevailed, which was increased by the heavy rains to which they were exposed in their ill-constructed huts.

In passing through the Portuguese territory the troops were regular and orderly in their conduct towards the inhabitants, which formed a striking contrast to the cruelty and rapine that, of late years, have disgraced the armies of France. The people were civil, but considerable difficulties occurred in provisioning the troops. Saltero, a contractor at Lisbon, had agreed to supply the British army with rations on their march through Portugal: but this man having failed in his contract, the divisions of Lieutenant-

General Fraser and Major-General Beresford were obliged to be halted, and, had it not been for the great exertions of these Generals, the further advance of their troops would have been long delayed.

The army had marched from Lisbon without money, and great inconvenience was the result. The difficulty arising from this being at length surmounted, Sir John Moore, on the 12th of Nov. 1808, arrived at Cuidad Rodrigo, and on the 13th with his advanced guard at Salamanca; the leading regiments from Almeida, on the following day, and, excepting the 1st battalion of the 32d, which was left to bring up the heavy stores from Villa Velha, all the troops reached Salamanca before the 24th. Previous to his entering the city he was apprised that the army of Estremadura, commanded by Blake, had been defeated after several actions, commencing on the 31st of October, near Sornosa, where he was repulsed, and obliged to retire on Valmaseda, and from thence on Espinosa de los Montreros. At the first place an action was fought on the 5th November, which was partially favorable to our allies,—but an attack made by the French on the 10th and 11th, at Espinosa de los Monteros, completely destroyed the Spanish army; their left wing was forced to give way, and the road by which the Spanish General attempted to defile, being commanded by a hill in the possession of the enemy, further resistance, on the part of the Spaniards, was useless. On the second night after his arrival, Sir John was awakened by an express from General Pignatelli, the Governor of the province, to inform him that the French army had taken possession of Valladolid, twenty leagues only from Salamanca. This intelligence gave the British General the greatest uneasiness: he had only three brigades of infantry with him, and none of his artillery had come up. In this dilemma his first thought was to fall back upon Cuidad Rodrigo; but he soon learnt that the enemy had retired to Palencia, and that none of their infantry had advanced beyond Burgos; he, therefore, sent orders to Sir David Baird, who had arrived with a force of12, 000 men at Coruña, on the 14th of October, and Sir John Hope, to concentrate their divisions, and join him with all speed. Every day now brought with it new causes of anxiety, and intelligence of fresh disasters. Blake's army was dispersed, and Buonaparte was at perfect liberty to turn his force against Castanos, or march to prevent a junction of the English. Sir John Moore, placed nearly in the centre between two divisions

of his army which were approaching upon Salamanca by different points, was compelled to remain inactive. In this situation of affairs, his mind naturally desponding, was overwhelmed by fears for the future: perceiving the supineness of the Spanish government, and indignant at discovering the weakness which they had concealed from him until he was in the heart of Spain,—he began to despair of their cause. He saw nothing around him but an inactivity, which he attributed to torpor and indifference. They had not, he said, shewn themselves a wise and a provident people; their wisdom was not apparent in their actions. Such were the impressions the British General received of the Spanish nation,—the gloomy side of the picture alone presented itself, and he daily regretted his advance into the country without having previously ascertained the real sentiments of the Spanish nation, and their ability to resist the invaders.

The army under Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird reached Coruña on the 14th of October, as before stated. It did not appear that the Junta was prepared for the arrival of those troops, and consequently it became necessary to send an express to the Supreme Junta, at Madrid, for directions in respect to their debarkation. Sir David Baird is a brave experienced veteran,—he had signalized himself in Indian warfare, and conducted, with considerable ability, across the burning sands of Arabia, the army destined to co-operate with Sir Ralph Abercrombie in the expulsion of the French from Egypt; but the difficulties he experienced in the first instance, respecting the landing of his troops, and subsequently in their advance through the country, gave him an unfavourable idea of the cause in which he was now employed, and his sentiments unhappily tended to increase the despondence which had already taken deep root in the breast of the Commander of the Forces.

The Junta of Coruña consists of representatives from the different towns in Galicia; they compose the executive government of the province, under the controul of the Supreme Junta at Madrid. It was therefore necessary, before any steps could be taken, to wait the arrival of the courier who had been dispatched to Madrid. The General Officers were all on shore, having obtained apartments after some delay,—and permission was given for a certain proportion of officers from each regiment to land during the day, and return to

their ships at night. But previously orders were issued, representing the propriety of observing a friendly conduct towards the Spaniards, and enforcing the most respectful attention to their religion and customs. This necessary caution was productive of the happiest effects. Much pleasant and agreeable intercourse took place between the British Officers and the families of the town: and as the opera was open every night, it was crowded with officers as well as ladies, who not only invited the English to seats in their private boxes, but, laying aside the hauteur and jealousy of their national character, insisted upon taking them home to supper after the entertainment of the evening.

By permission of the gentleman who drew up "a Narrative of the Operations of Sir David Baird's division," which has appeared in a cotemporary publication, we have inserted his valuable notes on Coruna, &c.

Coruna, one of the principal sea-ports in Galicia, possesses a most commodious and safe harbour, formed by a body of rock projecting to the bay, on which is a castle well mounted with ordnance. In approaching the bay, from the North, the harbour of Ferrol and the arsenal are distinctly observed.

It is curious to remark, but it has so appeared, that most of our unsuccessful attacks have been made against the Spaniards,—witness Santa Cruz, or Teneriffe, Ferrol, and Buenos Ayres. That of Santa Cruz was unfortunate, not from want of ardor or heroism, for our ever to be lamented naval hero, Lord Nelson, commanded. The account, given by the Spaniards, respecting the ill-fated attack upon Ferrol, confirms the idea entertained of it in England;—when our troops landed the Spaniards were panic-struck, the garrison was weak, and not prepared for an attack, and, although there were numerous bodies of troops within two days' march, yet so torpid were the motions of the Spaniards, that we might have taken the place, destroyed the arsenal, effected every necessary purpose, and reimbarked before a sufficient force could have been collected to act against us. The more recent catastrophe of Buenos Ayres closes the military exploits of Great-Britain against the Spaniards. As things have turned out, perhaps it is for the best.

Coruna is strengthened by batteries and guns mounted at all points,—the citadel is strongly fortified, as is the town, but both are commanded by heights within a short distance. The citadel forms a small town, and contains the houses of the people of distinction, and one or two convents. It is composed of narrow streets, paved with rough flag stones; the houses are very large; the ground-floors are used entirely for offices, the first floors being the rooms chiefly inhabited, with balconies and windows which open like folding doors; the furniture is gaudy, but not elegant. There is little appearance of comfort within their houses, not even the sociable sight of a blazing fire,—and, although the weather, whilst the British troops were in Spain, would have admitted of some artificial heat, there was no such thing as a hearth in any of the rooms.

The Opera-house is tolerably good:—the sides are occupied by private boxes; the pit is made very commodious, with rows of seats formed as chairs,—the gallery is specially set apart for females, no male being ever admitted. Considering that

The accompanying notes, although not properly coming within the province of history, nor usually detailed in a narrative which

the actors repeat verbally what the prompter reads, they get through their parts with much spirit:—the music is pleasing, and they dance a sort of *pas de deux*, with castanets, called a bolera, and a fandango, with much exertion, but with very little grace;—the women are not active,—they make more pleasing actions with their arms than legs, in using the castanets;—the bolera music is simple and pretty.

The churches are good buildings, but the altar pieces gaudy. The Virgin Mary and Infant are in most churches represented by figures three feet high, dressed with much heavy ornament and rich lace, and are preserved in glass cases; the saints also are figures about four feet high, and fixed in niches.

The principal inhabitants of Coruna dress after the English mode, but in the street you seldom see a gentleman without his cloak, which, in all seasons, forms a material part of their dress. The ladies, when walking, wear over their gowns a black silk or stuff petticoat, and, the greater part of them, a mantua like the oblong shawl worn by English ladies,—and, as they have no ornaments on their head, it is brought close over the forehead, and either made to hang loose on the front, or crossed once or twice, and the ends to hang behind;—some ladies wear this cloak made of crape and of fine lace, black or white. In their houses they are more frequently in black, though in the mornings they wear gowns of English manufacture. Their clothing is remarkably neat about the feet, but the symmetry of their legs and feet is not beautiful; their persons being in general short, it follows that their legs and feet are thick, yet many walk very elegantly. In manners, the Spanish women are remarkably mild, affable, and attractive. The hair, which is allowed to grow very long, is twisted and tied up tight at the back of the head. During war it is a custom with the nobility not to dress gaily, but to appear poor. The poorer sort are similar to the lower orders in this country, and equally as noisy, quarrelsome, and violent. There is evidently an indolence of disposition prevalent among them, which is highly disgraceful:—men and women sit in the sun for hours during the day, amusing themselves with their thoughts, or else occupied with their fingers in the heads of their neighbours, reclined either on their lap or a stone for convenience. They certainly are not very cleanly in their persons or clothing, and generally are bare-footed as well as bare-headed. The men are stout and well-proportioned, and accustom themselves to a prodigious extent of whiskers. The prevalence of their religious enthusiasm and observances are great obstructions to industry; there are so many saints and holidays,—so many priests and churchmen, that little room is left for exertion. The holidays are observed with more external devotion than the Sundays;—on the latter days dealing is continued, and, except certain house-trades, has no interruption:—on a holy, or a saint's day, it is quite the contrary,—the shops are shut up, and all appearance of trade removed. The mornings are devoted to prayers, and the evenings are spent in a kind of religious pastime,—for the higher order of ladies, who dress themselves more than commonly elegant, wearing white, or coloured satin shoes, and silk stockings, resort to every church in the whole town or citadel, beginning at the most distant, and visit each, repeating certain prayers with much seeming devotion in all of them, and in this manner keep praying their way home, or take a walk on the road to St. Lucia, a small town just without the gates of Coruna.

professes to treat of military occurrences, have been extended to some length, with a view of conveying a just idea of the manners

Smoking is a favourite amusement of the Galicians; exclusive of the luxury it affords, they esteem it a preventative from diseases arising out of colds and damps from the quantity of rain which falls in that province.

On all occasions of public rejoicing the Spaniards express their joy by firing cannon, rockets, illuminations, processions, feasts, and ringing of bells.

Provisions at Coruna are cheaper than the general prices in England. There was some little trade during the time the British were there, in consequence of the port being open. Every article of Spanish manufactory is certainly two centuries behind ours, and not so low-priced. The shops are small and ill-provided. The mules are good—and the horses small; Indian corn, barley, grass, and straw, are the chief provender. The Spaniards have little idea of the utility of horses, except for parading; they accustom them to a heavy, clumsy short-bridle, which throws the horse on his haunches at the risk of a broken jaw and a broken neck. In Galicia they are very small and cheap, but at the time the British troops were there the price was considerably advanced, as the possessors took every advantage they could, and generally obtained their demand.

The soil around Coruna is thin, light, and of very little depth, there being a species of granite stone under:—the roads are excellent, but such streets as are not great thoroughfares are rugged, and frequently not paved;—they are swept by felons chained together. The few trees about Coruna are apple, pear, chesnut, date, and plumb. The country abounds with game;—partridges, hares, snipes, woodcocks, and a few pigeons; the partridge is larger and more beautiful than the English partridge, but the hares are similar to ours. The generality of the roads in Galicia are remarkably good, which may be owing, in some measure, to the mode of transplanting heavy goods chiefly on mules. A few ill-constructed carts are employed, drawn by two small bullocks, driven, or rather led, by a stout man, who, walking in front of the animals, leads them with a halter from the head of each; he has a stick with a small pike at the extremity to goad them occasionally;—this vehicle being extremely low, narrow, and clumsy, will carry from six to eight hundred weight; and, as the Spaniards have no idea of greasing the axletree, when loaded, they send forth a horrible noise. The mode of conveyance for travellers is by post, in exactly the same kind of vehicle as represented in Gil Blas,—*viz.* a carriage similar to a one-horse chaise, covered in, with a platform behind for trunks;—it is drawn by one mule in the shafts, and another as the leader, on which a man rides. The trappings and harness are chiefly made of cords, with leathern ornaments and belts:—this machine proceeds about four miles in an hour. A single traveller may hire a mule for himself, which will carry him and his portmanteau:—the man to whom the mule belongs will run before, at the same rate of four miles an hour, but all is tedious and inconvenient. The Spanish stable, at a country inn, is a room in the house, with a sort of manger badly constructed. The cavalry barracks at Coruna are large rooms, forming two sides of a parallelogram, very inconvenient, and, excepting a few for the horses of officers, have neither rack or manger;—there is generally an ascent of three or four steps to these stables.

The mode of living in Spain is certainly not congenial to that in this country. The first orders take in the morning, either in bed, or soon after they rise, chocolate, with cakes or bread, having first drank some cold water, which is always brought

and customs of a people possessing a great natural reserve and jealousy of strangers, whose character in this respect bore a strong resemblance to that of the British, now, for the first time after the lapse of a century, visiting their shores on terms of amity and mutual confidence; yet the leading features of a Spaniard were totally dissimilar to those of their noble-minded and generous ally. Proud, ignorant and superstitious, their nobler faculties were obscured by the indolence of their lives, and the blind obedience universally paid to the dictates of their crafty priesthood.—But the real energies of the national character, freed from the sloth with which it had been too long encrusted, were now to be called into action, and a series of the most brilliant exploits in the field have proved the Spaniards yet a warlike people, capable of the greatest sacrifices in the cause of liberty.—Their patriotic efforts have, fortunately for the freedom of the world, met with the most cordial assistance from Great-Britain, who had long and successfully resisted, single-handed, the attempts of the French ruler at universal subjugation.

with the chocolate.—The dinner hour is from eleven till two o'clock, seldom later: the tables are about eight feet wide by ten long, covered with one large cloth, and a plateau is generally placed in the centre with figures in wax; and bottles of wine, corked, placed round the rim of it.—Bread covered with a napkin denotes the place of each of the party.—The dinners in the best houses consist of soups and a variety of dishes which encircle the plateau.—Each person sitting opposite to a dish, whether of meat, fish, or vegetable, fills his own plate, carves the contents, and hands it round; so that during the whole time of dinner, if a large party, they are continually passing and repassing plates of different meats, &c.—The Spaniards, who are great eaters, fill their plates with something of every sort which passes.—Some of the dishes are palatable to Englishmen; but their meats are covered with oil and garlic.—Their soups are good—the meat is generally boiled in large unshapen junks, or in pieces, and mixed with potatoes mashed with oil.—The Spaniards rarely eat salt or pepper.—They seldom use a knife except in cutting up the contents of the dish next to them.—A piece of bread and a fork answers their purpose, as to what is on their own plates.—The pastry is particularly good.—The fish is a side dish.—Generally after the soup are two dishes, one of meat boiled, and boiled fowls, together; and the other a sort of stew with sausages, of which garlic is a material ingredient: the vegetables are frequently mixed together.—Strangers eat and drink as they please—no healths drank, &c.—The deserts consist of apples, pears, chesnuts, walnuts, dates, prunes, and olives.—The cloth remains; but napkins on each side of the plateau are taken off before the desert is introduced.—There is not that reserve or respect observed by the servants who attend the table, as in England.—They laugh at a joke, and set you right when they think you wrong in relating a story.—Both men and maid servants throughout the Peninsula are dirty, slovenly, and awkward.

The enthusiasm displayed by the people of Coruña was great; all ranks and descriptions presented themselves for service in the field, to oppose the French, whom they universally appeared to hold in abhorrence and detestation.—There were also at Coruña two regiments of patriots, who seemed particularly anxious in their desire to learn the military art.

Permission being at length received from the Supreme Junta, Sir David Baird directed the embarkation of his troops to take place by brigades, and preparations were made for advancing into the interior.—The Lieutenant-General had been accustomed to an Indian army, possessing every facility of moving with comfort, and even luxury; it was now his duty to march an army through a country where it is not without difficulty a party of travellers can obtain food, and which had already been drained by its own troops; besides, his commissaries were not only inexperienced in the business of their department, but ignorant of the language.—Some confusion arose respecting the supplies: the orders from the Supreme Junta directed the nation to provide the British troops with whatever they might need, and the Junta at Coruña gave every demonstration of readiness to meet the wishes of their superiors; notwithstanding which, the issue of provisions and forage was tedious and inconvenient.—Sir John Moore, in a letter to Lord William Bentinck, observes, "that he is sorry to say, from Sir David Baird he heard nothing but complaints of the Junta of Coruña, who afford him no assistance.—They promise every thing, but give nothing; and after waiting day after day for carts, which they had promised to procure for the carriage of stores, his commissary was at last obliged to contract for them at an exorbitant price.—This is really a sort of conduct quite intolerable towards troops that the Spanish government have asked for, and whose advance they are daily pressing."

Owing to these circumstances, Sir David Baird was under the necessity of dividing his army into small detachments, which followed each other at considerable distances: the light brigade was at the head of the column, followed by the brigade of foot guards to St. Jago.—They were to make three stages to this town, resting the first night at Carrol, a very filthy and small village; the second night at Ordenes, consisting of a church, and three wretched farm-houses.—These stages were about ten miles each; the third

to St. Jago, is about eighteen English miles.—The conduct of the officers and soldiers of the guards was highly to their credit; from the time they disembarked, fewer excesses were committed by those men than in any regiment of similar numbers, and their officers preferred sharing with them their quarters, than profiting by the billets offered them.—Out of 2,500 men, when they were put in motion, they only left twenty sick at Coruña.—Other regiments, not half their numbers, left twice as many.

The road from Coruña to Carrol exhibits a bare country, few trees, but here and there a chesnut orchard, and one or two stinted oaks. The little land that bears any cultivation is a wretched proof of the state of agriculture in Galicia.—On quitting Carrol, the road is a gentle ascent for some miles, on the right of which is a valley somewhat better cultivated, with a river running through the centre, and one or two good houses, with rather more wood around. The Lombardy poplars and ash are here and there intermixed, with a few oaks and chesnuts.—The best dwelling appeared to consist of a farm-house and mill, with a tolerable garden and orchard.—The cottages are very indifferent, having no chimney; the smoke, consequently, penetrates through all parts of the roof.—They have little or no furniture; and pigs, which are certainly of the largest and best-proportioned kind, with the mules, &c. are the inmates of the cottage.—On leaving the vale, the country loses at once all appearance of cultivation, and exhibits a barren heath, interspersed with broom and furze. The road is a continuation of hills till you reach Ordenes. The troops which rested there on their road, found no one thing to refresh them after their fatigue. Whilst on the march, the inclemency of the weather obliged the troops to seek for better shelter than could be found in the quarters allotted them, and to effect this, after coming to a halt, many were obliged to proceed four or five miles further, with a miserable prospect of obtaining some kind of covering during a tempestuous night, but without a regular supply of provisions. The troops were quartered in St. Jago generally in convents; the officers obtained billets on private families.—The novelty, or perhaps a more generous sentiment, induced the superior orders of the inhabitants to treat the strangers with great hospitality and kindness, and they felt disappointed when delicacy prevented the British officers living entirely with them.—The lower classes, having a different con-

ception of things, would have put two officers in one miserable bed in garrets; but a remedy was effected by the palace of a duke being opened for their convenience, and a suite of rooms unfurnished were allotted for the reception of officers, who gladly made their beds in these commodious apartments.—The stables, which in England would be the cellars, were given up for the horses.—The soldiers were lodged in the apartments of the convents of different orders of friars—monks and military jumbled together—cordiality was maintained, and all seemed satisfied with their accommodation. With much difficulty, patience, and perseverance, the men got provisions, and the horses provender, after remaining without almost one whole day; the men had then to dress their meat, and the wood supplied for that purpose was old trunks of trees, wet and hard. In this early stage of the campaign a good lesson was learned, viz. for every one to be at all times prepared, if possible, with twenty-four hours provisions.

On the 7th of November the right wing of the first regiment of Guards marched for St. Gregorio, on the road to Lugo, the weather extremely wet. The rest of the column followed the same route successively. At St. Gregorio, there being no cover for the troops, they were obliged to encamp for the night. Such was the confused state of the Spanish government at this period, that no regular mode existed for supplying the troops with provisions: whether this arose from the Spaniards being averse to supply us, or from their natural indolence, or from what cause soever, the allowances were obtained with the greatest difficulty. Different reasons were assigned for this tardiness on the part of the Spaniards,—the real cause, however, may with equal truth and certainty be attributed to their imbecile and inefficient government.

The roads from St. Jago to Lugo are certainly extremely bad, narrow, and rocky, frequently so deep and hilly, that a horse can with difficulty keep his footing,—and even the little heavy, clumsy carts can get along but a mile in an hour. The country from St. Jago to Sobrado is a continuance of hill and dale; very little fertilization, and scarcely an appearance of a live animal. Heath and furze are the only covering to the soil in this bleak part of the country, which presented a very different aspect to what the British troops had been taught to expect:—houses, or rather huts, thinly

scattered, and the people who inhabit them, a set of miserable half-clothed mountaineers,—of harsh features, and strongly limbed. Half-way between St. Jago and Lugo is a large convent of friars, which was liberally thrown open for the reception of the British columns. At this place the officers and men were accommodated with comfortable lodgings,—and a table was prepared for the former, consisting of savoury Spanish dishes, and tolerable wine. This religious house consists of three large quadrangles of two stories, with double rows of piazzas. There are commodious lodging-rooms in part of this immense pile of stone buildings; it had been constructing eight years, and was not above half-finished. The original edifice, with a most costly and admirably well-finished chapel, the monks describe to have been built one thousand years. The interior of the chapel is infinitely superior to any building in that part of Spain; the most striking object to a stranger on entering it, is the altar-piece. The altar is advanced from the window, and through the arched openings is seen the sun in full splendour painted on the glass. There are two large rooms, the roofs of which are domes of stone, but of very light and beautiful architecture, and at least a dozen altar pieces, that are highly painted and gilded, particularly the passion of our Saviour in *basso relievo*. All the figures are naked, excepting the Holy Virgin and her sister, who are dressed in brocade gowns, and have gold ear-rings. The convent has extensive gardens, and a paddock of sixty acres, surrounded by a very high wall. Leaving Sobrado, the country still continues to have a dreary aspect till you reach Favoli, a miserable village half way to Lugo. Some officers were quartered in the only house that had the appearance of a room, and that was inhabited by mules, pigs, and poultry, indiscriminately. The entrance to this room was through a hay-loft, and but one window with shutters, and no glass. The owner was a lawyer or scrivener, and the only one who could write: like the country towns and villages in Great-Britain, this limb of the law occupied the best house in the place, nor was he at all behind-hand in his charges; in short, the lawyer of Favoli is the lawyer of the world, only with one difference, this Mount Scrivener had neither pen, ink, or paper in his house.

On quitting this place, the road continues as bad as heretofore with the addition of rocks and stones, which frequently oblige the

horses to proceed with great caution. In approaching Lugo the country begins to assume a more fertile aspect, and presents the view of a fine river, whose banks are shaded with oak and chesnut. The oak trees in this part of the country are more numerous, and of a larger size than those before-mentioned. Several farm-houses and home-stalls, with plenty of cattle, agreeably surprised the troops, and formed a pleasing contrast to the appearance of the country through which they had first advanced after quitting Coruña.

The army with Sir David Baird reached Lugo on the 15th of November, after a tedious march of four days. Lugo is a town similarly situated as St. Alban's, and about the same size. It is oppressed by having a great number of religious houses: there is a square, two sides of which have piazzas, and a cathedral,—but excepting a sort of altar in the centre of a square place, over which is a dome, and a profusion of silver, there is nothing particularly striking: there are hot baths to 100 degrees of heat, built by the Romans, and which are found effectual remedies for the rheumatism. Lugo is surrounded by a wall, said to have been built 300 years before Christ: it withstood all the attacks of the Moors, never having been taken by them; at present a small battery would soon shake it to pieces. The country from Lugo is hill and dale, some parts cultivated, but in general barren heath, and a few scattered houses. Half-way to Villa Franca is a small village, called Constantine, of the same description as those already mentioned. Villa Franca is a town less than Lugo, and contains little worthy of mention. The road from hence to Bembetri is very good, and the country exhibits variety of vineyards, mountains, woods, vallies, and water. On the right of the road, about three leagues over a plain, and passing two villages with woods of oak, the land fertile, but covered with numerous large stones, is Ponteferada, a better built town than Villa Franca, but not quite so large; it is dirty and ill-paved; the inhabitants like those of the other places through which the British had marched. Whilst our troops were there, snow covered the tops of the mountains, and altogether exhibited a fine winter season. The river is shallow, but rapid, and runs on a rocky bed. From thence to Astorga the road is partly on the side of mountains.

About the 18th of November the position of Sir David Baird's army, with the advance somewhat beyond Astorga, and a tail of troops reaching to Coruña, became a matter of serious moment. The Lieutenant-General, therefore, assembled his general officers, and informed Sir John Moore of their unanimous opinion, in consequence of Blake's army being defeated, and the critical situation of that under Castanos, that he ought not attempt to advance till his force was assembled there, which would not be before the 4th of December. The distance between Coruña and Astorga is little more than 200 miles, but the British commissaries were at that time inexperienced, and the Spaniards gave no assistance to facilitate the advance of the troops. Sir John Moore's opinion of the hopelessness of affairs was thus confirmed by the report Sir David Baird made of the difficulties he had already met with in his march from the coast.

On the 28th of November Sir John Moore received the intelligence of the armies of Arragon and Valencia, under Generals Castanos and Palafox, being defeated at Tudela. He had never entertained any other expectation; it had always been his opinion that the South of Spain should have been fixed upon as the scene of action in preference to the North, and that Cadiz, not Coruña, should have been chosen for the disembarkation of the British, who might afterwards form a junction at Seville or Cordova. He now determined to retire upon Portugal. In this case Sir John expresses himself in a letter to Mr. Frere, "I shall fall back upon my resources at Lisbon; cover a country where there is a British interest; act as a diversion in favor of Spain, if the French detach a force against me; and am ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again render it eligible. By marching into Spain I detach myself from my resources, and should probably be able to take with me a small portion of the military stores I have brought forward: in which case I should not be able, for a time, for much contest: but every thing could be sent from Lisbon to Cadiz, and thence join me. The movement into Spain is one of greater hazard, as my retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain. I shall be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but, perhaps, this is worthy of risk, if the government and the

people of Spain are thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their defeats; and, by collecting in the South, be able, with the aid of the British Army, to resist, and finally repel, the formidable attack which is prepared against them."

On the same day that Sir John Moore made this communication to Mr. Frere, he expresses himself, in a private letter to Mr. Stuart, as follows:—" I have every inclination to think well of the Spanish cause; that I wish it well is most certain, and shall be most proud to give it every aid in my power; but, really, so little ability has been displayed by the government, or by those employed to direct their armies—there appears so much apathy in the people, and so little means prepared for resistance—that I do not see how they can stand against the enemy. The French will have troublesome subjects; but in the first instance, they will have little more than a march to subdue the country. I have not a shilling. The Spaniards, I find, promise much more than they perform: and here we have not been able to get 5000l. The house, you mentioned in a former letter, has money, but will not give it. Sir David Baird, upon some false intelligence that the French had collected a large force at Rio Seco and Ampudia, has taken measures to retreat, but I shall be able to stop him; and I hope, by the 7th or 8th of December, we shall be able to effect a junction. I hope to meet Romana on his passage to the army. The intelligence was sent to Baird by General Blake. The French have many friends in this country; it is from them that a thousand reports are daily spread to the disadvantage of the *good cause*."

An air of despondency is perceptible throughout this letter; and circumstances, henceforward, unhappily tended to increase the gloomy presentiment of the future, which, fatally for the cause of Spain, filled the mind of the British General. It is true, the patriotism, which he had been taught to expect, was not visible in the actions of the Spaniards, nor was a due attention paid to the wants of their ally; however, this cannot, with justice, be charged upon the people, but was, in truth, owing to their disjoined and ill-constructed form of government, in which there was not a sufficient portion of talent and ability to direct and organize the vast means and resources of the kingdom.

Previous to the destruction of the army commanded by General

Castanos, at Tudela, Sir John Moore entertained a slight hope that something favorable to the cause might yet occur; this unfortunate event, however, confirmed the apprehensions, which, all along, found too ready an admittance into his breast. The first idea that presented itself afterwards was a retreat upon Portugal, although by so doing he was aware that an opportunity would be afforded the enemy of destroying the remaining Spanish armies in detail. While a respectable British force remained in the country, the patriotic spirit was kept alive and animated to a further resistance against the power of France. Of this Sir John Moore was sensible, and also of how much importance the presence of his army was to the success of the great struggle in which Spain was engaged; yet, by remaining in his present position, he was afraid of drawing the whole power of the French upon himself. With this impression upon his mind, he ordered Sir David Baird to fall back upon Coruña, and sail from thence to the Tagus, directing him to write immediately to England, and request that transports might be sent without delay to Lisbon, as he conceived it would be impossible to defend Portugal if Spain was completely subdued by the enemy; and, therefore, the only remaining object appeared to be the embarkation of the troops. This object seemed now to be uppermost in his mind, as he concluded the safe return of the army would be grateful to the people of England; and reconcile them, in some degree, to the disappointments which, he was well aware, would be generally felt on the non-success of the measures proposed by government, to secure the Peninsula from the thraldom of Buonaparte. He had written, a few days before, to Lord Castlereagh, saying that he had ordered a depôt of provisions, for a short consumption, to be formed at Almeida, and perhaps the same should be done at Elvas; in that case the progress of the enemy might be checked, while the stores were embarking at Lisbon, and arrangements were made for carrying off the army. Beyond this the defence of Lisbon, or of Portugal, should not be thought of. In communicating his resolution of retiring to the British government, Sir John Moore wrote in the same desponding spirit. "Portugal," he said, "could not be defended against a superior enemy; the Spaniards, however, might rally in the south,

and the English might still be of use if they were landed at Cadiz. But it was impossible to be very sanguine on the subject, after what had been seen."

When the intention of retreating was made known to the army at Salamanca, it was very generally disapproved of. Murmurs, against it, were heard in every quarter, from men of all ranks. Even the Staff Officers lamented this resolution of their Commander, and doubted the wisdom of his decision. In his letter to Mr Frere, written before the defeat of Castanos was known, Sir John Moore proposed the question, what the British army should do, in case of that event; whether he should retreat upon Portugal, or march upon Madrid, and throw himself into the heart of Spain? thus to run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation. "The question," he observed, "was not purely a military one. It belongs, at least, as much to you as to me to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish government, and the opportunities you have had of judging of the general state of the country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance that is likely to be offered. You are, perhaps, better acquainted with the views of the British Cabinet; and the question is, what would that cabinet direct, were they upon the spot to determine? It is of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered; it is comparatively of very little, on whom shall rest the greatest share of responsibility. I am willing to take the whole, or a part; but I am very anxious to know your opinion." Mr. Frere knew that what the Spanish government most deprecated was, a retreat of the British upon Lisbon, from the well-grounded apprehension that it would depress the hearts of the whole country, and would make them believe, that England, after an ineffectual effort, had relapsed into the old limited system of protecting Portugal. If, therefore, a retreat was determined upon, as absolutely necessary, he thought the army should fall back upon Galicia, and the strong country about Astorga. But, he said, in his reply to the Commander of the Forces, that Leon and the two Castiles (with the exception of La Mancha and the city of Madrid) were the provinces least distinguished for a military, patriotic, or provincial spirit in all Spain; the people had been passive during the late events, and had seen their country successively occupied by the strongest party. It

was difficult to blame them; living in open villages, in vast plains, without arms and without horses, they had neither the means of defence or escape.—That country must necessarily belong to the party which was superior in cavalry; yet there was no want of a right feeling: the towns were abandoned at the approach of the enemy: not a single magistrate had been brought over to take the oath of allegiance to the intruder, nor had the French been able to enlist a single soldier.—The other provinces were possessed by the most ardent and determined spirit.—There was no doubt of the people.—The government was new, and had hitherto been too numerous to be very active; but there was hope that that inconvenience would soon be remedied.—"They are resolute," said Mr. Frere, "and I believe every man of them determined to perish with the country.—They will not, at least, set the example, which the ruling powers and higher orders of other countries have exhibited, of weakness or timidity."

Great advantages, the Ambassador thought, would result from advancing speedily to cover Madrid.—It was a point of great moment for effect in Spain, and still more in France, and in the West of Europe.—The people of the town were full of resolution, and determined to defend it, in spite of its situation; and nothing could be more unfavorable to the claim of the intruder than a siege of the capital. The first object of the English therefore, he thought, should be to march there, and collect a force capable of resisting the French, before further reinforcements arrived from France.—There were reports that the resistance to the conscription had been much more obstinate than usual, and a pastoral letter of the bishop of Carcassone seemed to prove that these reports were not wholly without foundation.—Any advantage obtained over the French at the present moment would be doubly valuable, as it would render a conscription, for a third attempt upon Spain, infinitely difficult, if not impracticable.—But if, with their present strength, they were allowed to retain their present advantages, and to wait the completion of the conscription, they would pour in forces which would give them immediate possession of the capital and central provinces, and the war would then be reduced to an absolute competition between the two countries which could stand out longest against the waste of population.—If, however, Mr. Frere said, this view of the

subject should not appear sufficiently clear or conclusive to the Commander-in-Chief, to induce him to take this step, which he, the Ambassador, was well convinced would meet with the approbation of His Majesty's government, he would venture to recommend retaining the position of Astorga.—A retreat from thence to Coruña, (as far, said he, as an unmilitary man may be allowed to judge of a country which he has travelled over) would be less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought in that position to wait for reinforcements of cavalry from England: the army would thus be enabled to act in the flat country, which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castile.

Before this letter arrived, the General's resolution had been taken, in consequence of the news of Castanos' defeat.—It was not shaken by the able reasoning of the Ambassador, notwithstanding he had asked his opinion, and he waited only for the junction of General Hope to commence his retreat on Portugal.—The plan, which Mr. Frere had proposed, of making a stand at Astorga, Sir John Moore appears not to have deemed worthy of consideration: yet he had been informed that the passes of the Bierzo might be defended by a thousand men against an army of twenty thousand; and no person who had ever travelled through that country could doubt the truth of the opinion.—On the 5th of December a messenger arrived, with a dispatch from the Prince of Castel Franco and Don Thomas Morla, informing him, in the name of the Junta, that about 25,000 men of the army of Castanos were falling back on Madrid, to unite with its garrison; that 10,000 from Somosierra were coming to the city for the same purpose; and that nearly 40,000 would join them.—With that number of troops, the French army, which had presented itself, was not to be feared.—But the Junta, apprehending an increase of the enemy's forces, hoped he would be able to unite with their army, or fall on the rear of the enemy; and they did not doubt that the rapidity of his movements would be such as the interests of both countries required.

This letter was written on the second, and it is now proved that the men who signed it were then plotting to betray their country; but the success of their treason was not yet certain, and though

they might have wished, and designed to draw on the British army to destruction, the proposal that it should advance came not from them alone, but from the civil and military Junta also, and was such as true patriots would have given.—While Sir John was considering this letter, Colonel de Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, and denizened in England, arrived with dispatches from Mr. Frere.—Colonel Charmilly was in Madrid on the night of the 1st of December, when the inhabitants were working by torch-light at the trenches, breaking up the streets, and barricading the houses.—He had seen the Duke Del Infantado, who told him that a new Junta had been formed, of which he was the president; that there were provisions and ammunition in Madrid; that more than 30,000 men had that day enrolled themselves as volunteers; and that it was of material importance to the common cause that the British Commander should make a diversion, which would compel the French to divide their forces, and thus afford some relief to Madrid, which he was determined to defend to the last moment.—This he requested Colonel Charmilly to communicate to Sir John Moore, as he himself had been an eye-witness of the spirit of the people, and the preparations which they were making for resistance. By another grandee (whose name does not appear) he was requested to inform Sir John, that he must employ this moment to save Spain, by making conditions with the Junta for a better government, but especially that he should require the Spanish army to be put under the orders of the British General for the time being, as it had been formerly under Lord Peterborough.

When Colonel Charmilly reached Talavera de la Reyna, on his way he found that Mr. Frere had just arrived, following the Central Junta, who were retiring from Aranjuez to Badajos: to him he communicated the state of Madrid, and the subject of his conference with the Duke del Infantado; and the Ambassador requested him, as a Colonel in the British service, to take charge of a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to suspend his retreat, as a measure which would have the worst effect upon the Spanish cause, and be of the greatest injury both to Spain and England.—But thinking that having commenced the retreat, Sir John might suppose his responsibility engaged to go on with it, Mr. Frere entrusted Col. Charmilly with a second letter, to be delivered in case the General

persisted in his determination of retreating.—The purport of the letter was to request the bearer might be examined before a Council of War; and the reason for this measure was, that the decision of a Council of War might exonerate the Commander-in-Chief from the responsibility by which he might otherwise feel himself fettered.

Charmilly reached Salamanca while Sir John was deliberating upon the dispatch from Morla and Castel Franco.—He delivered the Ambassador's first letter.—The state of Madrid, Mr. Frere said, was so strong a confirmation, or more properly speaking, so much exceeding every thing which he had ventured to say of the spirit and resolution of the people, that he could not forbear representing to the General, in the strongest manner, the propriety, not to say the necessity, of supporting the Spanish people by all the means which had been entrusted to him for that purpose. "I have no hesitation," he added, "in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach itself to this advice, as I consider the fate of Spain as depending absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you may adopt; I say for the present, for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success." Having read this letter, and heard Charmilly's communication, Sir John Moore gave him no reason to suppose the idea of retreating was given up. He retired, however, to reflect upon what he had heard. His instructions directed him to receive the representations both of the Spanish government and the British Ambassador with the utmost deference and attention:—both deprecated his retreat.—Charmilly had been an eye-witness of the preparations which were making in Madrid, and accounts confirming his report came from various other quarters. Sir John Moore was persuaded that a great improvement in the public affairs had taken place, and that it was not becoming him to fly at such a time; and he wrote, that night, to Sir David Baird, telling him to suspend his retrograde march till he heard again, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga, should it be necessary.

Still the rooted feeling of his heart was despondency.—In his letter to Lord Castlereagh, of the 5th of December, he thus expresses himself:—"I find considerable hopes are entertained from the enthusiastic manner in which the people of Madrid resist the

French: I own I cannot derive much hope from the resistance of one town against forces so formidable, unless the spark catches, and the flame becomes pretty general; and here the people remain as tranquil as if they were in profound peace.—I have, however, in consequence of the general opinion, which is also Mr. Frere's, ordered Sir David Baird to suspend his march, and shall continue at this place until I see further, and be guided by circumstances—unless the spirit becomes general, Madrid must soon fall.—At all events, if I marched into Portugal, it would be with a view to return the moment a favorable opportunity offered:—but I shall not go towards Madrid until I know with more certainty the force of the enemy, and see something to convince me that more confidence can be placed in the steadiness of the Spaniards." Next morning, December the 6th, he addressed Sir David Baird to the following purport:—"I wrote to you last night to suspend your retrograde movements—I now write to beg that you will put to the right about, and return bag and baggage to Astorga.—The people of Madrid, it is said, are enthusiastic and desperate, and certainly at this moment do resist the French—the good which may result from this it is impossible to say; I can neither trust to it, nor can I altogether despise it.—If the flame catches elsewhere, and becomes at all general, the best results may be expected; if confined to Madrid, that town will be sacrificed, and will be as bad or worse than ever.—In short, what is passing at Madrid may be decisive of the fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to aid and take advantage of whatever happens.—The wishes of our country, and our duty demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended.—I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it."—These were ominous words: it was apparent that he had no confidence in the patriotism of the Spaniards, nor in his own means of resisting the French, however strong the country; it was apparent also, that while these apprehensions weighed upon him, he looked forward with dread to the opinion of the English public, and in deference to that opinion he was sacrificing his own.

While Sir John Moore was dispatching these instructions to General Baird, it was not known at Salamanca that he had changed his intention of retreating; officers and men alike were delivering

their opinions loudly, and speaking of another investigation.— Charmilly hearing this, and being equally ignorant of the determination which had been formed, supposed that his second letter was necessary, and accordingly delivered it. The general, not perceiving the intent for which it was written, and feeling like a high-spirited officer, who thought himself injured, tore the letter in pieces, and gave vent to his indignation in violent language. Part of his anger fell upon Charmilly, and on the following day, he ordered him to quit Salamanca. By what authority he was empowered to order an English subject to quit a Spanish town, he probably did not ask himself; and his prepossession against Charmilly, as a French emigrant, prevented him from perceiving that there were circumstances in his situation which might exempt him from such a suspicion, or from feeling the cruelty of thus insulting and disgracing an officer in the British service, because he had been trusted, by the British ambassador, with a commission which had offended him. Charmilly respectfully represented that he had not deserved this treatment. The General replied, that he did not mean to give him the smallest offence; but he repeated the order, and it was obeyed.

Sir John Moore, in his resentment against what he conceived the improper interference of the ambassador, soon, however, recollected what was due to him as the king's minister. He told him, therefore, that he should abstain from any remarks on the two letters delivered by Colonel Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied them. " I certainly," said he, " did feel and express much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. These feelings are at an end, and I dare say will never be excited towards you again. If M. Charmilly is your friend, it was perhaps natural for you to employ him; but I have prejudices against all of that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him." He informed the minister that every thing should be done for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause, that could be expected from such an army as he commanded; but he could not make a direct movement on Madrid, because the passes of Guadarrama and Somosierra were in the hands of the French, and besides he was much too weak until joined by Sir David Baird.

On the following day, December the 7th, Sir John received a letter from the Junta at Toledo, telling him that they intended to re-unite the dispersed armies their, and defend the city to the last extremity. He replied, that if the Spaniards acted up to such sentiments, there could be no doubt of their ultimate success, whatever temporary advantages the French might gain; and he sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures for its defence. On the 8th, he informed Sir David Baird, that he should move a corps on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, and ordered him to push on his troops, by brigades, to Benevente. But on the 9th Colonel, now General Sir Thomas Graham, whom he had dispatched to Morla and Castelfranco, returned from Talavera with tidings that these men had betrayed Madrid. The number of the French there, was computed at between 20 and 30,000, and it was said that they remained at the Retiro, not having taken possession of the city, in consequence of the temper of the inhabitants. Another part of the French army was engaged in besieging Zaragossa. From Toledo, the news was equally discouraging; Victor no sooner approached the place, than it surrendered to him.

These circumstances did not induce the British General to alter his plan; his object was to threaten the French communications, and draw their attention from Madrid and Zaragossa, and thus favor any movements which might be projected by the armies forming on the south of the Tagus. If no advantage was taken of it, and no efforts made, he saw that the French might turn against him what portion of their force they pleased. That they would be able to do this he expected; and he believed that nothing which his army could effect would be attended with any other advantage than the character which might be won for the British arms. He looked, therefore, to a retreat as an event which would soon be unavoidable; in his dispatches home, dissuaded the government from sending out reinforcements, and desired that transports might be ready, at Lisbon and at Vigo, to receive the troops; being fully persuaded that the efforts of England would be of no avail, and that it would be necessary to evacuate the Peninsula.

He left Salamanca on the 12th of December. Lord Paget, with the principal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro to Tordesillas; and General Stewart surprised and cut off a party of French who

were posted at Rueda: this was the first encounter between the British and the French in Spain; and the prisoners all declared that it was universally believed the English army had retreated. On the 14th, when Sir John was at Alaejos, a packet of letters, from the head-quarters of the French army, was brought to him. Some peasantry had killed the officer who had them in charge: among them was a letter of Berthier to Marshal Soult, directing him to take possession of Leon, drive the enemy into Galicia, and make himself master of Benevente and Zamora: he would have no English in front, it was said, for every thing evinced that they were in full retreat. A movement had been made to Talavera, on the road to Badajos, which must compel them to hasten to Lisbon, if they were not already gone; and when they had retired, the Emperor thought Soult could do whatever he pleased. It appeared from this letter, that Soult had two divisions with him at Saldanna; that Junôt was collecting another at Burgos; and that another under Mortier (Duke of Treviso) had been ordered to march against Zaragossa.

Sir John Moore had intended to march to Valladolid, but seeing that Soult was stronger than had been represented, he thought it better to move to Toro, and unite his army there,—Sir David Baird doing the same at Benevente, from whence the two corps might be joined, either by a forward or flank movement, and strike a blow against Soult, before that General could be reinforced. The cavalry under Lord Paget were pushed so forward, that their patroles reached Valladolid; and frequent skirmishes took place, in all of which the British displayed that superiority which, whenever a fair opportunity is given them, they are sure to maintain. In one of these actions a French Officer of Chasseurs was cut down; his cloak-bag was found to contain a silver ewer and bason, beaten close together for more convenient packing,—the handles of some silver knives and forks, a great many trinkets plundered from the churches, and an embroidered jacket with the badge of the Legion of Honour. On the 20th the Commander of the Forces reached Majorga, where Sir David Baird joined him. The British forces were now united; they amounted to 23,000 infantry, and about 2300 cavalry, besides some small detachments left to keep up the communication. The numbers of effective fighting men in an army, differ much from the

total number of the various corps, owing to sickness, absentees, and various contingencies: the following is a correct extract from the Adjutant-General's reports.

Effective Soldiers who marched from Portugal, under the command of Sir John Moore.

Description of Troops.	Regiments.	Officers commanding.	Nos. R&F	Total.
Artillery	Royal Artillery	Colonel Hardinge	686	686
Cavalry	18th Light Dragoons	Lieut.-Col. Jones	565	912
	3d Do. of King's German Legion	Major Burgwedel	347	
Infantry	2d Regiment	Lieut.-Col. Irenmonger	616	
	3d Do.	Blunt	815	
	4th Do.	Wynch	754	
	5th Do.	Mackenzie	833	
	6th Do.	Major Gordon	783	
	9th Do.	Lieut.-Col. Cameron	607	
	20th Do.	Ross	499	
	28th Do.	Belson	750	
	32d Do.	Hynde	756	
	36th Do.	Burne	736	
	38th Do.	Greville	823	
	42d Do.	Stirling	880	
	43d Do.	Hull	411	
	50th Do.	Major Napier	794	17,755
	52d Do.	Lieut.-Col. Barclay	828	
	2d battalion Do.	Ross	381	
	71st Do.	Pack	724	
	79th Do.	Cameron	838	
	82d Do.	Eyre	812	
	91st Do.	Major Douglas	698	
	92d Do.	Lieut.-Col. Napier	900	
	95th Do.	Beckwith	467	
	95th Do.	Major Travers	321	
	Staff Corps	Captain Leicester	61	
	King's German Legion 1st Light Battalion	Lieut.-Col. Leonhart	803	
	2d Do.	Halkett	865	
				19,353
N. B. The 2d Regiment, except the Grenadier Company, being left to keep up the communication with Portugal				715
		From Portugal		18,638

Effectives of Sir David Baird's Army.

Description of Troops.	Regiments.	Officers Commanding.	Nos. R. & F.	Total.
Artillery . .	Horse Artillery . .	Captain Downman .	177	611
	Royal Do.	Eveleigh . .	434	
Cavalry . .	7th Hussars . . .	Lieut.-Col. Vyvyan .	497	1,538
	10th Do.	Leigh . .	514	
	15th Do.	Grant . .	527	
Infantry . .	1st Foot Gds. 1st batt.	Cocks . .	1300	8,573
	Do. 3d battalion . .	Wheatley .	1027	
	1st Regiment, 3d batt.	Major Muller . . .	597	
	14th Do. 2d battalion	Lieut.-Col. Nicholls .	550	
	23d Do.	Wyatt . .	496	
	26th Do.	Maxwell .	745	
	43d Do.	Gifford .	817	
	51st Do.	Darling .	516	
	59th Do.	Fane . .	557	
	76th Do.	Symes . .	654	
	81st Do.	Major Williams . .	615	
	95th Do.	Lieut.-Col. Wade . .	699	

Total effective Men under Sir David Baird - -	10,722
Ditto under Sir John Moore - - - - - - - -	18,638
Total of both Armies - - - - -	29,360

On the 21st of December, the head-quarters were advanced to Sahagun; the weather was severe, the roads bad, and covered with snow; and as the soldiers had suffered a great deal from forced marches, the General halted, that they might recover.—A co-operation was also completely concerted here between the British and Romana, who was collecting the wreck of Blake's army at Leon.—They were in a miserable state—badly armed, and worse clothed; but they might still occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, and, if they were defeated, would prove active in completing his destruction.

Soult had concentrated his troops, to the amount of 18,000 men, behind the river Carrion: every arrangement was made for attacking him, and orders were issued accordingly—never more welcome to a British army.—The convents in Sahagun were prepared for the reception of the wounded, and the soldiers confidently anticipated a glorious victory.—Would to God their wishes had been consulted, and the sad disasters which afterwards befel this gallant army might never have happened. But the sentiments of

the general were not in unison with his brave troops. "The movement I am making," he said to Mr. Frere, "is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior forces, but to have my communication with Galicia intercepted. I wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish cause, and that we do not abandon it until long after the Spaniards had abandoned us." The truth of the matter was, that the army were perfectly sensible nothing whatever had been done by their leader for the Spanish cause—from the beginning he had viewed the passing events in a sombre light; he was disgusted with the misconduct of the Spanish government, and he had no faith in the patriotism of the people: his own judgment would have led him to fall back from Salamanca; and he only advanced because he knew what would be the feelings of the British nation, if its army had retired without attempting any thing. Offended with Mr. Frere, for having given his opinion, when he himself had asked it, he did not deem the wise suggestions of that minister, as to making a stand at Astorga, worthy of consideration. It was at once rejected as futile; and he advanced against this detachment of the French, "bridle in hand," as he himself expressed it, "and expecting to have a run for it," not thinking that any possible benefit could result from a victory, but seeking an excuse which might appear valid to the people of England for evacuating the Peninsula, and leaving Spain and Portugal to their fate.

(To be continued.)

MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE.

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION TO OFFICERS, CIVIL AND MILITARY, GOING OUT TO LISBON, OR ON FOREIGN SERVICE.

[Continued from page 160.]

LETTER VI.

My Dear Friend, *Off the Lizard*, 3d *May*, 1812.

I CAN now resume my pen—the hurry and bustle of embarkation being over, and our voyage having been accompanied by fine weather and a six-knot breeze from the North.

First, I will again revert to the management of embarking the military of every description at Portsmouth.—As a family man I have been particularly unfortunate.—After a detention of seven weeks for the ostensible purpose of being well accommodated, I was ordered on board a horse-transport, and immediately repaired to the ship, and fixed upon my birth.—As the vessel was one of the largest and most commodious of the kind, I felt grateful to the Agent of Transports for this pleasing mark of his attention to my convenience.—Officers embarking in transports must understand, that government having provided them a birth, find nothing further than a most miserable mattress and blanket, which being all that is between the body and the hard bottom of the birth, those unaccustomed to sleep on the ground, will not find this accommodation very agreeable.—The ship allowance of provisions, which is tolerably good, is delivered out at the caprice of a ship's steward; and an officer is obliged to provide himself with every utensil for cooking, eating, and drinking, and, unless he has a servant, must be his own cook, waiter, chamber-maid, &c. for the masters of transports refuse all accommodation whatever.—After being once embarked, there you must remain, even if the ship should stop a month, for although the men are in a great degree unemployed, you are not permitted to use the ship's boat.—It appears that the Transport Board supports them in this unaccommodating custom, but they are not aware, I should suppose, of the inconvenience and expence officers are unavoidably put to, or that by giving the masters of transports power, how insolently they exercise it.—I had been embarked a few days, and took the opportunity when I saw the boats (three) unemployed, to request being put on shore, my daughter's health requiring medical aid—I was refused—and it cost me 10s. 6d. for a boat.

Are the Gentlemen Commissioners of the Transport Office married? or are they strangers to the great difficulties officers labor under from the scantiness of pay, that they consider it sufficient to give them a wooden birth, and subject them to the insolence and brutality of masters of transports?

An officer having received a written order from Captain Patten for a passage in a transport, goes on board, and shews it to the master of the ship—the reply is—"very well"—the fellow turns away, and the officer takes his quarters where he can, and, as I

have already mentioned—a wooden birth, a flimsy mattress and blanket, are all that our generous government allow to a gentleman going out to fight his country's battles—to maintain her independence, and even her existence—nor will the captain of the vessel provide him with accommodations for cooking, &c.

I must remark on what is certainly an oversight somewhere, and leads to much unpleasantness.—A variety of people obtain passages in these vessels, and frequently there are a dozen allotted to one cabin, perhaps men in very different situations.—If a horse ship, and the officer who commands the troops embarked is acquainted with his duty, and performs it as he ought to do—'tis well!—but, if as in an instance that came under my own knowledge, that of a Lieutenant of Cavalry, who, uniting insolence with ignorance and presumption, not only assumed the command of the vessel in which he was embarked, but would, if not timely checked, have turned a young lady, an invalid, the niece of a Field Officer, out of her cabin.—This man, either from ignorance or idleness, totally neglected the party, consisting of fifty men and fifty horses under his command, during the whole voyage: and to interfere with this man, an officer, though superior in rank, will forfeit his own quiet, and probably be led into much expence: but it was a duty incumbent on him.—Rules and regulations should be made for the express purpose of this service, which might benefit officers, and establish an understanding amongst those embarked in the same vessel, though on different services: for, strange as it may appear, there are many of the cavalry officers who indulge their vanity in supposing they are on no occasion to be commanded by infantry officers; and, consequently, being thus ignorant of their duty, the service suffers.

To return to my own situation, I had not been embarked one week before ten gentlemen came on board, with orders for their passage from Captain Patten, chiefly Commissaries and Hospital Mates, and this, to my astonishment, when there were five or six ships which had not one officer on board, consequently, comfort and convenience gave way to confusion and disorder, and I have to return my acknowledgments to the Agent of Transports for having detained me seven weeks, at a heavy expence, for the purpose of giving me a convenient birth, and afterwards crowding thirteen into the same cabin.

From the above it will appear, that an absolute necessity exists for all officers and gentlemen of every department, who are ordered to embark for foreign service, to provide themselves not only with a certain stock of provisions, but also with bedding, utensils for cooking, for the table, &c.; otherwise he will be put to great inconvenience, difficulty, and distress.

I would therefore recommend such gentlemen, as soon as they receive the order for their passage on board any particular transport, to ascertain, if possible, who the rest of the passengers are, and then to form a mess, deputing one of the party to purchase whatever may be required, and thus establish a little independent society of themselves.—But as all articles of *sea stock* are extravagantly dear at Portsmouth, it would be adviseable, if time will admit, to purchase the stock for the table at one of the neighbouring towns; either at Havant, Emsworth, or Chichester; the latter is most preferable: and as cooking utensils will be found very useful when on service, I recommend every officer providing himself accordingly: but he must likewise contrive his baggage so as to be convenient and suitable to the mode of transporting it fixed on mules: a large trunk will be found very cumbersome; two portmanteaus, of equal dimensions, are best adapted for camp equipage: but I shall enter on this subject more fully when I have been at Lisbon some days.

Ever yours faithfully.

(To be continued.)

GENERAL OFFICERS' AND SUBALTERNS' PAY.

To the Editor of the Military Panorama.

Sir, *November* 16*th*, 1812.

HAVING for many years been accustomed to the society and acquaintance of Military men, from serving with them on the Staff, at home and abroad, in quarters and in the field, I am highly interested in every thing connected with the welfare and glory of the British Army, and have perused with infinite pleasure the Prospectus and two first numbers of your highly interesting and useful work: if continued on the same plan, and with the same impartial views, it must, and will, produce most important benefits to the service, as well as hand down to the historian and future ages, in glowing characters, the lives and achievements of the British heroes. In your former num-

bers, two letters have appeared on the subject of the Insufficiency of Subalterns'* Pay *on a march*, and of that of General* Officers having only half-pay of their regimental rank; which statements are so clear and convincing, that I cannot believe, from the present liberal system pursued under the able direction of the Royal Commander-in-Chief, these things will remain long without being remedied, when it will cost the country only 50,000l. per annum, to make both classes of officers comfortable; and, surely, if that sum (which is quite sufficient) will save our warlike youth, and our veteran grey-headed Generals from a prison, they ought no longer to be left within its ruinous vortex—for how many of them must be without private fortune, and their only alternative is to compromise their character, as gentlemen, or get into debt. My object, at present, is to recommend the employment of officers who have lost limbs, been otherwise severely wounded and rendered incapable of active service in the field, or who have lost their health and constitutions.—On the Recruiting Staff, great, and I believe, very beneficial changes are now made, and making, in that department, and which is a very important one. The permanent appointments, (for such I think they now are) must be desirable in the highest degree, for men, who would, of necessity, otherwise go on half-pay, and retire perhaps for ever from the service on it, and their pension, which no doubt will now make them far more comfortable: yet, I conceive, that by appointing *them* to this duty, two very important ends are accomplished—you reward the services

* The Editor feels much pleasure in acquainting this Correspondent, that since the publication of the letter alluded to, a paragraph has appeared in the different Journals announcing that a provision is to be made for the benefit of old General Officers, of a certain number of years actual service, whom it has been impossible otherwise to provide for, by regiments or governments.—There are many of this description, upwards of 40 years in the service, who have no other emolument but the full or half-pay of Lieutenant-Colonel.

The above is a proof of the real advantages which the Army may derive from a work conducted on the principles of the Military Panorama, and particularly at a period like the present, when its government is entrusted to an Illustrious Prince, who is always happy in receiving suggestions for amending different branches connected with it, and ready to improve on a well-intended hint; and who, it will be admitted even by his enemies, has contributed by personal and indefatigable exertion, more to the improvement of our forces, and the comforts of both men and officers, than any Commander-in-Chief Great-Britain ever enjoyed.—A further Plan for providing General Officers with Independent Incomes will appear in our next number.

of brave men who have suffered and bled in defence of their country, and you gain the *active service abroad* of those who must otherwise remain recruiting at home, which has become more than ever desirable for married officers; but I think these before-mentioned have a far better claim.

Wishing your work may be eminently successful, as it must be useful, and that it may rival the Naval Chronicle, which has been long eminently well conducted, and produced most important advantages to the naval service,—I remain, yours, DIOMEDES.

SABRES.

Mr. Editor,

OF late a great alteration has taken place in the dress and equipment of our soldiers, calculated no doubt, principally, with a view to efficient service in the field.—It has long been a subject of wonder, that officers going on actual service, are not ordered, or allowed to provide themselves, with sabres.—The regulation sword is surely no weapon to defend against the sabres of the enemy, used either by cavalry or infantry, and this in many instances, particularly in the battle of Albuera, wherein British officers were cut down, without having any chance of making a successful resistance. At home the regulation sword may do well enough, although, I confess, I wish to see it exploded from the service (except for the Regimental Staff) but on service it is of no sort of use, either as an offensive or defensive weapon. Z. Y.

Anecdote of heroism in a French, and magnanimity of an English Officer.

AT the attack at Dominica, in the West Indies, by the Rochefort Squadron, in 1805, after the French had failed in two attempts to storm our position at Point Michel, they made a third and last most desperate effort, and a column of grenadiers advanced in the most undaunted and imposing manner, for this purpose. Our men were all covered by the barrier wall, except Capt. Archibald Campbell, now Major of the 46th regiment, who singly observed the motions of the enemy. When within ten yards, he called up his men, the grenadiers of the 46th, who were on advance and al ready, and seeing the French Colonel cheering his men, "Avancez mes enfants, avancez," Captain Campbell seized a musket from

his right-hand man, determined (being a good shot) to have himself the honor of firing at the French Commander, who saw him level at him, and called out in the most heroic manner, "tuez monsieur, tuez." Captain Campbell instantly put down the piece, exclaiming, By God, I cannot kill so brave a fellow; but gave his men the word, and he fell, pierced with several bullets: the column instantly broke, and were miserably cut up in their retreat.

DOMINICUS.

N. B. The French Officer was of the 26th demi-brigade.

MILITARY OBSERVATIONS.

No. 2.

PUNISHMENTS.

TO those who are acquainted with the heterogeneous composition of an army, it must prove idle in the extreme to suppose, that a military body can exist without the necessary ingredient of well-timed *punishment:* no matter how administered, but it must be applied. It needs no logic to demonstrate,—no rhetoric to persuade,—that such is the case; for it was never pretended that an army could exist without it, until it came into the head of some of our *comical* legislators to broach a different doctrine, and boldly to assert, that it was a sin "crying to heaven for vengeance," to punish a soldier, however deserving of chastisement he might be; nor are these wondrously wise lawgivers without their partisans on the wrong side of the door; beings, who either smarted under the lash themselves, or, while they served in the ranks, had that lash continually held "*in terrorem*" over their backs, their superiors knowing that a pure principle of honour could not bind such to their duty. The Westminster Baronet, from his classical reading, might have collected, that, among the Romans, the punishment was in general proportioned to the crime, or fault committed: some punishments branded the soldier with disgrace,—others afflicted the body; they were either dismissed from the army with ignominy, or retained in the ranks, their pay being stopped; the latter was also the case with those who had been rewarded with a *spear of honor* for some remarkable exploits; they remained in the regiment, but were deprived of the badge which they had received: when a whole cohort lost their standard, they were obliged to eat barley-

bread, their allowance of *wheat* being taken away from them: for trifling faults, for instance, not being present immediately when the roll was called, the offender was made to stand bare-foot before the General's quarters in view of his comrades; when a Roman soldier used disrespectful language to his officers of any denomination, a surgeon opened a vein in one of his arms, as his indecorous conduct, on such occasion, was ascribed to wantonness, and a heat of blood; he was flogged with a stick, or made to run through a line of soldiers, each striking him on the bare back with a rod; this was the punishment inflicted on the soldier who had forgotten the *parole*,—taken a false oath against his comrade,—stolen any thing in camp,—contracted a disease in his intercourse with females,—and lastly, who had been punished three times for the same fault: when the crime was a general one, such as *mutiny, &c.* the regiment was drawn out, and every *tenth man*, on whom the lot fell, was cudgelled to death; this was the "*decimatio legionis*:" it sometimes happened that the General, in *his clemency*, only punished the *twentieth*, nay, the *hundredth* man; this was "*vicesimatio*, or *centesimetio legionis.*"

Before the *Count St. Germain* introduced "*les coups de plat de sabre*" as a punishment into the French army,—strokes of the flat part of a broad sword applied to the back,—there was a room in every barrack set apart for confining soldiers,—it was called "*la salle de police*;" there they remained, according to the caprice of a commissioned, or non-commissioned officer, a week, ten days, a month, or more, for they knew nothing of a court-martial; some were allowed only bread and water, the remainder of their pay going to the mess who mounted guard for the confined culprit; others had their mess sent to them, but all of them were drilled twice a day during the period of their confinement; they lay upon straw all the time, without ever having much of that: drunkenness was a weighty offence, and it often happened that the prisoner, sentenced to the picket, was compelled, in expiation of his intemperance, to drink a whole bucket of water, "*stans pedé in uno*;" others were condemned, in the cavalry, to carry a certain number of cloaks, or saddles;—all this the French bore with much patience, but when the strokes of the sabre became the substitute for *la salle de police*, they felt their *amour propre* deeply wounded, and upwards of 20,000 men deserted in a year! The Revolution, however, has so

accustomed Frenchmen to every species of degradation, the national character is so completely altered by it, that, what would formerly have been considered as a violent outrage, is now deemed something approaching to a compliment.

The Austrians,—who are only half humanized,—automata machines—experience the most rigorous treatment;—when ordered by a *Corporal*, for instance, to prepare for punishment, you will see the degraded individual prostrate himself, receive 100 or 200 strokes of a cudgel, not *a priori*, and then, standing up, *cap-in-hand*, return many thanks to the Corporal for the trouble he has taken in teaching him his duty!

The *Russian Officer*, and non-commissioned, beat their men in the face with their *fist*, but for great offences, the offenders receive the *knout*, or strokes of a stick on the soles of the feet, and they expire not unfrequently under the punishment. Their officers are often reduced to the ranks, and then promoted again, if they happen to deserve it.

The Prussian Soldiers are treated nearly in the same manner as the Austrians,—that is to say, *like dogs*; but there is nothing so common as to see a Prussian Officer *in irons*, and lodged in the same prison-room as the privates.

Now, with respect to our own British Soldiers, it may be said, that they are more civilized than any others, and that punishment should be less frequent among them; nor, perhaps, would it be proceeding too far to say, that, if the *English and Irish* were as *abstemious* as the Britons of the North, punishments might be wholly unnecessary; but, until such a *desideratum* be attained, we must contend that it would be unsafe to explode flogging in the army.

J. N.

ADDRESS

To the Officers and Men composing the Regular Militia, on the supposed intention of their being called to extend their Services.

AT this momentous crisis, when the efforts of all independent nations and legitimate sovereigns are called into action to support those rights, which have been, by them, for centuries inherited;—to check the lawless encroachments of a Vile Usurper, whose ambition knowing no bounds, aims alone to wrest the sceptre and the crown, which have so long graced the brows and decked the thrones of

monarchs, determined to extinguish the flames with which the Corsican has too rapidly consumed the charters of some of the most powerful, and once the bravest nations of Europe, and to retard, as much as possible, the progress of those conflagrations which have spread destruction, disease, and all other concomitant evils among the loyal, peaceable, and industrious inhabitants of the greatest parts of the Continent. Then, when we, as Britons, draw the retrospect, and behold on one side of the canvas, our own internal felicity, and on the other, view the great and glorious struggle in which we are engaged, for the liberties of a brave and loyal people,—how proud and thankful should we feel in the blessings we enjoy under a constitution which can enable us to participate in so just and so noble a cause; in our Councils, from whose profound wisdom and deep discernments we are provided with those means which not only ameliorate the sufferings of hardship, but gratuitously aid the wants of those nations whose coffers have been pillaged by the sanguinary hordes of Buonaparte's Bandittis: when the possession of all these blessings is maturely considered, how truly grateful should we be to that Power from whom alone "all blessings flow!" who gives energy to our minds and strength to our nerves, to meet and combat in so magnanimous a cause.

The nation, impressed with sentiments so characteristic, my brave companions, may shortly invite you to partake in the honors and dangers of that field, wherein, perhaps, your fathers, your brothers, are now engaged; the brightness and unsullied reputation of your arms, taken up in defence of your country's weal, will ever shine conspicuous in the annals of history;—yet, hesitate not, if hesitation there can exist,—should your country call for your further aid, to step nobly forward, and face that foe, who, with his myrmidons, are already collected, with the vain hope of striking a tremendous blow, by which they as vaguely imagine the pride of England will be conquered, and the bright diadems of Spain and Portugal will again be within their grasp; but, remember, my friends, it is a Wellington who protects them! let that thought discard every other from your breasts,—so bravely on! your powers combined, with the true Son of Valour at your head, will dauntless lead you to victory: the vauntings of the leaders of the Corsican's legions will at once, when aided with your steels, be hurled into that abyss where dark oblivion will for ever obscure them to rise no

more; and, as on the famed plains of Salamanca, the genius of Wellesley, running from rank to rank, will soon scatter terror and dismay amidst the phalanxes of imperious France: while defeat will be on their train, triumphant victory will follow you in every step, to bind your foreheads with her gayest chaplets. The fervent prayers of thousands will ever be yours,—a nation's gratitude will await your return;—beauty's tears will profusely flow to the memory of her fallen heroes,—but beauty's eyes will, with anxious solicitude, hover around the southern horizon to welcome and embrace, on their native shores, those fathers, brothers, husbands, the brave deliverers of an injured people; the most celestial sensations will be awakened and predominate in your own breasts for having obeyed the voice of your country, and been the protectors of millions of your fellow creatures: posterity will with grateful acknowledgments, read of your heroic exploits, and of those god-like dictates of the heart, which urged you on to join your brethren in so dreadful, yet so just a conflict. You are soldiers, and many of you have been matured in the school of arms for these twenty years past, and have as honorably and gallantly wielded them in the defence of your country; ever grateful, she now may offer you an accumulation of those honors you have already earned, by calling on you to share in common with the rest of our countrymen; honors which alone are to be reap'd in the camps of real glory. The endearing ties of nature may, for a moment, damp the ardor of that martial spirit which glows in the veins of every true-born Briton; let the momentary pang be endured,—but when reason regains her wonted sway the native effusions of the heart will burst forth, and pourtray in colors most refulgent, the more sacred ties by which we are united to our dear country; these just, but sombre reflections, will in part be dissipated when we look round and behold the numbers of our fellow soldiers, equally bound by every social and domestic tie, and blessed with the tender pledges of connubial joys, gallantly stalking forth and treading the paths of honor and renown,—having subdued this, the most delicate feeling of the human heart, what else on earth will restrain the Independent Sons of Albion from clashing their arms with those of the Intrepid Arthur? surely the thought is almost impious! the ideas emanating from the pampered luxuries which have crowned your festive boards; the balls, the routes, the gaieties of the metropolis, which have been by you so oft enjoyed;

the easy marches you have experienced, and when over, partaking of the delicacies of a well-stocked larder; these, contrasted to that which is more likely to be your fare, when actively employed, cannot for a second curb the enthusiastic ardor for the attainment of that fame which has been left you as a legacy by your forefathers. No! your valiant souls shrink, I feel, at aught so base,—even proud and individual independence herself gives way, and England's cause and honor triumphs,—the sparks of patriotic fire kindles in the bosom of each commander,—the unsoiled banners of the regiments are unfurled,—the noblest sons of Briton's isles lead the example,—and, buckling on their steel-edged swords, mount their well-bred coursers, and speed to the field;—there their brave battalions, with uplifted spears, wait, in anxious battle array, for the signal to advance,—it's given, and each imagination now's on fire, for 'tis Britannia's trumpet sounds, calling on her gallant leaders, who, with falchions shining as resplendant as the cause they have espoused, are heard with cheers to exclaim, "hark, brave friends and associates, it is England's voice, we will obey,—for England expects us now to do our duty;"—the words are taken, and, like the electric fluid, it runs from right to left, and nought is heard but "England," Aye, "England and King George, the guardian of his people, and the sole protector of the rights of injured nations.

November 27, 1812. ONE ANXIOUS FOR THE CAUSE.

List of the Army Buonaparte took with him into Russia.

Poles	60,000	Goths and Weimar	2,000
Saxons	20,000	Wurtzburg and Franconia	5,000
Austrians	30,000	Mechlenburgh, Nassau, and small Princes	5,000
Bavarians	30,000	Italians and Neapolitans	20,000
Prussians	22,000	Spanish and Portuguese	4,000
Westphalians	20,000	Swiss	10,000
Wirtembergers	8,000	French	250,000
Darmstadters	4,000		
			493,000

Correspondence from the Theatre of War in the Peninsula.

CAMP BEFORE BURGOS, 12th October.

I HAVE little to write that can amuse, situated as we are. The Marquis appears resolved to take the castle: *nolens volens;* but it will require time. I was witness to a transaction which must furnish you with a correct idea of the general system of Guerillas, and to what extent dependence can be placed in that description of force, which has been so lavishly commended. Four hundred well mounted Guerillas fell in with sixteen French dragoons, who immediately charged them;—away went the Guerillas, and in their route drove five British light dragoons off the road: but the latter, the 12th dragoons, in their turn charged the enemy, who immediately fled. Don Julian, the Guerilla Chief, in support of this affair stated, "That his forces are not intended for the charge, but merely to harrass the French and cut off their supplies." For both the latter they answer admirably; but I think it rather disgraceful that so strong a force should betray timidity, and be put to flight by a handful of Frenchmen.

Bivouac, Burgos, 12th October, 1812.

I have little of novelty or information to offer since dispatching my last letter,—exposed to wind and rain, our chief object is to keep ourselves warm, which we endeavour to do at the expence of some Spanish landholders. The support of firing for three thousand men and officers, requires no small quantity of oak, which wood grows here, but of a prickly quality, small leaves, and stunted. Another fortnight will set our wits to work; for, by that time, no vestige of a forest will remain; but I hope before that expires, this castle will have surrendered; at all events we shall be moving. We have nothing stirring to enliven us. I assure you, an English newspaper furnishes an amazing treat; not a paragraph unread, not even an advertisement. Conceive, my friend, the dull round of a Bivouac, with the glorious uncertainty of fortune! I freely confess, that the routine of a regimental life is irksome beyond measure in a situation like this. I cannot help smiling to find the same thirst for news, and the same mode of searching after it, practised in a Bivouac as in Bond-street, with this difference only, that the "well, what's the news?" in Bond-street, implies a desire to be told any thing that is new: in a Bivouac it turns on our immediate field of operations,—we step not beyond ourselves! "How goes on the siege? Are any more killed? Will the castle be taken? Are we expected to march soon? Do we go into quarters?" To all which are given a variety of answers, such as are floating about, such as are dictated from different feelings: some encouraging, others despairing. We meet now and then with military politicians, who pretend to know more than their neighbours, and who freely condemn what in their wisdom they disapprove. But when we consider we are fighting the battles for our country on a *foreign* soil; that the scenes of devastation, destruction, and death, are distant from our native homes, we must be reconciled even to greater ills, admitting their productions and their assertions to be actually the fact. The report of to-day is, that the castle will be stormed in the evening, and a mine sprung under the convent, which is said to be the barracks. There has existed rather a degree of backwardness in some of the troops during the siege; perhaps the little prospect of plunder, damps their energy. We understand that the French army, amounting to 20,000, are about six leagues from us: but having only the high road to march upon, as we are on that, I have no idea they will make

any attempt to relieve the castle, particularly as we out-number them; what a new General may attempt, one cannot exactly say. Talking of our allies as forming our greatest number; there are plenty of Spaniards and Portuguese to be sure, but I would rather have one-fourth of the number of our own soil. I believe I mentioned the frequency of desertions from the Chasseurs Brittaniques, but I am glad to find it is confined to that corps, who were originally French, and are now a motley crew of all nations. If different measures were adopted with them, they might be more satisfied; at present, they are certainly drilled off their legs; but when in action, no men can behave better; they complain, and with some justice. Our German light troops are admirably well officered, well appointed, and well disciplined.

13*th October*.—The French army have made a demonstration of an intention to beat up our quarters, and relieve the castle; where, I should think, affairs are come to a crisis, as the firing last night was incessant, and has subsided this morning. In the mean time, the divisions of the army are all in readiness to meet the French on the road, and try the fate of another battle; our baggage ready to move off; perhaps we shall proceed to push the enemy across the Ebro: but this is only conjecture. At the same time, from the general aspect, I do not understand it is likely the enemy will attack us; but, "nous verons," let what will happen, I will give you the best account I can. The weather continues boisterous, but our men keep battering. Our cavalry and artillery train are in fine condition. I do think we shall have a winter campaign, and that it will be a rough one."

Monasterio, 17th October, 1812.

We left our delightful tinkering and came forward to this vile village. I think the description of the scenes at the advanced post will not be unentertaining. You may suppose a village on the high road about nine miles from head-quarters, the army occupying strong positions near to that place, the enemy about fifteen miles in our front. Imagine also, all the villages in the vicinity of the great road, right and left, to be occupied by the Spanish cavalry, Guerillas, and infantry; and suppose a village about six miles in front of our advanced position, on the great road. During the day, we occupy this village in front with a subaltern's picquet of cavalry, about eighteen men; having on the road also, between the two villages, an infantry picquet of seventy men. At night our subaltern's picquet retires from the village in advance, leaving a Corporal and six men about two miles on the road; he retires to the infantry picquet, which has a small picquet of one Serjeant and eight men in its front, about one hundred and fifty yards: this we consider as the night position. In the village, at our advance, is posted three squadrons of cavalry, two field-pieces, and a regiment of light infantry; and in a village contiguous, more light infantry.

Thus, my friend, I will give you the occurrences of twenty-four hours, and then you will judge of the nature of out-post duty.—At eleven, P. M. by intelligence from the front, report is made, the enemy is advancing in full speed; "Turn out! turn out! Send the baggage to the rear! Form the battalion!" Out we turn—away goes the baggage, with all our meat, drink, and clothing, except what is on our backs;—it rains in torrents:—having continued two hours in expectation of a move, ordered to quarters, not to unarm, but to be ready at a moment's warning to turn out. The rest of the night, and till four in the morning, sitting over a few ashes, cold and wet;—turn out at four as customary—wait till day-light—no appearance of an enemy—ordered to quarters all wet, dirty, cold, and our baggage nine

miles off;—in six hours the baggage returns;—just turned in. An alarm again—the Guerillas come gallopping in—the enemy are coming on—away goes the baggage again—out we turn—form in a field—wait, until an attack would be most desirable—another false alarm—return to our quarters quite wet, dirty, cold, and comfortless. From a variety of causes these alarms arise, and an extreme caution is highly necessary. We are continually exposed. As for the habitations and mode of living—the materials—they beggar all description. As the straw paliasse found in the houses, is a receptacle for all kinds of vermin, we prefer a blanket on the floor; but whether it is the heat that draws them, search of prey, or a roving disposition in the vermin, but so it is, we have a regular hunt after every hour's rest, and I assure you the slaughter is immense. In regard to what we eat and drink, I suppose an ordinary in St. Giles's would be a luxury; and often when nature is so exhausted that wet, cold, and hunger, is borne away by weariness and fatigue, and we sink on the dirty hearth of a miserable fire absorbed in sleep, the horrid and incessant squalling of children deprive us of that comfort, and we must appear savage to favour exhausted nature. Conceive then, my friend, fine elegant young men, who have paraded Bond-street, the very quintessence of fashion, whose stainless leathers and varnished tops, muslin folds and smooth chins, have stamped them the votaries of life and fashion, *you see here* with huge dirty mustachios or whiskers, ragged jackets, greasy shirts, filthy pantaloons, half a hat or foraging-cap, and misery depicted in strong colours in each feature. I think the idea of what an Officer or soldier should be in this country, is well described on the wall of a room at Castle le Bromeo, by a French Officer; he says, "To live in this country one should have the heart of a lion, the strength of a horse, the appetite of a mouse, and the feeling of a savage;" to which I, amongst the general opinion, heartily subscribe. But the grand consideration, that we are sustaining a conflict here to preserve our dear country from the local horrors of war, is paramount to every thing; it gives us fortitude and resolution, braces our nerves, and renders us irresistible; which, I humbly hope, God in his infinite mercy and goodness will continue unto us until we have defeated our enemies.

Bivouac'd opposite Tordesillas, the French on one side the River, and the British on the other, Oct. 31st, 1812.

We have had nothing but a series of fighting, marching, fatigue, cold, and hunger; and are now in a wet meadow up to our knees in mud. Until last night, we had not seen our baggage since the 21st; so conceive our filthy state. At present the sun shines, and we are warm; but devoid of all other comfort. I am, however, in good health and spirits.

The French, by numbers and superior cavalry, drove us from Burgos. The castle remained in their possession. Since the 17th, we have at times marched fifty miles a day; our rear continually engaged, but always successful. It was frequently a beautiful sight, as we often from the hills surveyed both armies. The French army is composed of bad infantry, but strong and fine cavalry; and are about 45,000 men, badly provisioned. We have enough, but 'tis beef and biscuit, and literally nothing else, except rum, and tea boiled in a camp-kettle.

I saw our gallant Marquis last night, with Sir Stapleton Cotton, sitting over a few embers, eating a crust of bread: thus we soldiers live. We certainly shall not fare worse, and may expect better. Ever yours.

Bivouac opposite Tordesillas, the French in the Town, the British in a Vineyard, the River between. *Nov.* 2, 1812.

We had not sufficient weight of metal to take the castle of Burgos. The French army was reinforced, and we were *driven* to this place, where I believe we concentrate all our strength; and I do think shall have a general action: and, to tell you the truth, fighting is much more preferable than what we endure; for the first, in general, lasts but one hour or two; and he is an unlucky man that is hit; but, exposed as we are to cold and wet, he is a lucky man who steers clear of ague, fever, or rheumatism. I have every confidence in the abilities of our Commander; and anticipate a glorious result to our arms. The advance of the French army was a beautiful sight: having forced us from our advanced post at Monasterio—an operation of three days—we retired to the next village, Quinta de Palia, at the same time quitting the villages on our flank, which had been occupied by our light cavalry. I have to describe a little affair between the Spanish and French cavalry. The latter advanced three squadrons towards a village; the Spaniards opposed with six squadrons; and, with the aid of a regiment of the 11th Light Dragoons, *charged* the French in front and flank, routed them, and killed and wounded about forty. It was a brilliant thing; because the Dons were new in the business, and had to attack veterans: at the same time it proves the benefit which arises to our allies in having the aid of an experienced soldier. The cavalry of the enemy outnumbered us astonishingly in this retreat; consequently our light cavalry fought to great disadvantage. When it is considered that forty squadrons were opposed to nine, it will readily be conceived, that although our men behaved gallantly, yet, having charged through one line, then a second, and to meet a third; and the first line closing on their rear, so as to oblige them to make a third charge to extricate themselves, some confusion must have arisen; and the French following up closely, the safety of the whole was endangered. This was observed by our noble Chief, who ordered a brigade of German light infantry to their support. Colonel Halket, who commanded the brigade, formed the two regiments into squares in eschellon. Our cavalry retired through this support; and the French, either impelled by ardor or the expectation of forcing the squares, followed the cavalry; and in passing between the two squares, received a steady well-directed volley from each flank of the squares, which completely discomfited them: between two or three hundred men and horses were tumbled in all directions. Confusion ensued; and although the French cavalry amounted to 2500, they have never since come within shot of the Germans, who received the thanks of Lord Wellington for their steady and resolute conduct. This has been a second instance of a corps of infantry, formed in square, repelling the attack of cavalry. I allude to the 5th and 77th regiments.

Many invidious remarks have been and are daily made here, where people affect to know something about the matter. I say affect, because I am thoroughly convinced we are all equally ignorant of the causes as well as object of our operation. But what will be said at home? I only recommend John Bull in future to be as moderate in his exultations as he should be in his despair. Whatever can be done that ability and courage can accomplish, we may reckon upon; but numbers, skilfully managed, create a formidable opposition. Should the Spaniards feel as they ought to do, numbers must declare on our side; but, until that spirit arises, we must act on the defensive, I suppose.

5th Nov.—We continue bivouac'd as before,—a system that seems mutually admitted between the enemy and us. The Douro separates the armies: the enemy have a

picquet of infantry on this side of the bridge; and their videt is within thirty yards of ours. The two men converse familiarly together; and, as our men and women are employed at the river in cutting wood, and washing; and our officers amuse themselves in shooting hares, partridges, and ducks, conversation continually takes place between the French officers and them, in good humour, and mutual confidence. This sort of civilized warfare (if I may be allowed the expression) will, I hope, deaden that savage animosity that subsists between the Portuguese and the French; although great allowances must be made for the feelings of the former, with regard to the barbarity of the latter in Portugal. You will be surprised to find how the bigotry of the Portuguese soldier is relaxed. Contiguous to our bivouac is a large deserted convent; and, as dry fuel was wanted for the purpose of cooking, parties were sent to strip the convent. Amongst others, I saw the Portuguese soldiers carrying away the gilt *pillars* and *pedestals* of the *altar-piece*, to dress their soup. The Virgin had made her escape; but St. Antonio and his holy *wooden* brethren suffered martyrdom without remorse: in a few days the bare and roofless building was converted into a temporary stabling; but I have frequently perceived in the conduct of the Portuguese and Spanish soldier, on entering the churches which necessity obliged to be converted into store-houses, a degree of careless inattention to the respect that heretofore was so rigidly exacted from them, and when the British soldiers, from an innate respect to the house dedicated to the Almighty, have, on entering, taken off their caps, the others have acted as irreverently. Perhaps this may improve their morals, for certainly when they are in appearance strictly devout, they are strictly faulty, if opportunities offer. Whether the Portuguese or Spaniards will ever become soldiers is a matter of doubt; the Officers of both countries are too rapacious, and at the same time too familiar with their men.

You would be surprised to meet some very elegant and charming women in the confines of a camp; but I assure you there are many: one young lady, attached to a noble, gallant, and brave officer, has shared all his danger, fatigue, and inconveniences. I have seen her riding coolly by his side when cannon balls have flown about them.—She accompanied him when on duty at the advanced post, within 300 yards of the French; and more than once she has been compelled to try the speed of her horse to escape from the enemy: her courage is equal to her fortitude, and with all the delightful softness of her sex, she possesses the heart of an Amazon. I confess I am not an advocate for such proofs of affection, and would rather spare the delicacy of her charming sex: but love vanquishes all our resolutions. It appears our army will occupy the South bank of the Douro, having Medino del Campo on our right, and Portugal on our left: at present, the Douro is fordable in many places, which will possibly keep us out a fortnight longer; but as General Hill's army has joined us, I should suppose we are now strong enough for offensive operations.—I hear it is in agitation to mount a portion of our light infantry on the country horses—I should think it a good measure. In spite of the dispatch made in our retreat, I do not find our sick list has increased; but on the contrary, diminished: and our battalions have gained numbers.—The men are now seasoned, and stand the thing well.

Salamanca, 9th November, 1812.

We have continued retiring to this city, in the vicinity of which, all our army, including Sir Rowland Hill's force, is concentrated.—The general opinion is we shall make a stand here, and that is probable; at all events we shall, I trust, have time to recruit ourselves and soldiers, for we all require it, as do Sir Rowland

Hill's army, whose retreat has been as rapid as our own. Variety of reports are in circulation, and propagated as these reports are, the effects of despondency, weariness, or hard fare, so it is we really accost each other as if fearing to learn what will prolong our sufferings; this, however, I am thoroughly satisfied about, if the enemy attack, they will experience a severe defeat; for although they are said to out-number us, they lose by attacking: the conflict will no doubt be desperate; but, as I have more than once observed, the desperation of a few hours is little, when compared to the indescribable sufferings during a hasty retreat in bad weather. This city, as you may imagine, is thronged with military of every description: to be sure, the fine, but fanciful, uniforms of our allies, and the assumed air of the officers, create a smile.—I trust we shall place little confidence in their support.—I now leave this subject, and take up one of much importance, and that is, the mode of carrying on the duties of the Staff, and, in the first place, the conduct of a certain Assistant Quarter-Master-General.—This gentleman's business is to ascertain either the quarters destined for the division, or the ground on which the division is to bivouac.—A division, during our retreat, had marched, perhaps, six leagues, the men were knocked up, and had not only to wait nearly two hours until the Assistant Quarter-Master-General could be found, and were then marched circuitously to their ground, which added two miles more to the day's marching; but this was not the only distress that arose from this officer's inattention; so much time was allotted to the men to light their fires, to cook their dinner, and to *rest*; and this time, in the first instance, was, for certain reasons, straitened to the bare possibility of effecting the object:—was it not disgusting, that two hours and a half should be wasted of time so particularly precious to the wearied soldier, from the supineness of the Assistant Quarter-Master-General? but that has frequently occurred.—In another instance, from the negligence of that description of officer, a division has not been timely warned of the hour it was to march, and, when the wearied officer and soldier were sunk in deep sleep, the consequence of uncommon fatigue, the order is hurried through the camp at six o'clock, A. M. that the division was to march at six o'clock, A. M. Conceive this to happen on a cold, wet, and dark morning; and the baggage, the sole comfort of the officer, was to have been sent away at three, A. M.—All is confusion, shivering confusion—all is packed—imagine the anxiety, the distress, the misery of such a moment:—the division is hurried off, nor can the weary, drowsy, chilled officer, know if the little compendium of all his wretched comforts is not taken by the enemy, and himself left without a second shirt, or the possible means of getting one—a blanket to keep out the dew or rain, or a single instrument that gives him a superiority over the brute creation, either at his meal or his repose.—An instance I this day witnessed of distress arising from the Assistant Quarter-Master-General's want of attention, shall close this subject, for I am sure you are already indignant: a division was marched at six in the morning to be cantoned in this city; the men in a convent; the officers on private houses: the convent stood ready, the gate was open, and the men, without any trouble to the Assistant Quarter-Master-General, took ready possession of it: but the officers, they were left destitute of habitation; the Spaniards would not open their doors without a billet being shewn.—No billets were prepared until after two o'clock in the day, when they were told so many houses in such a street were allotted for their accommodation; but already Spanish officers, soldiers, or others, were in possession of these quarters; or some of the inhabitants had locked up their houses, to prevent the officers being billeted on them, and were

gone.—In this dilemma you saw officers obliged to force the doors of houses—you saw them disputing with the people; nor did any sick officers obtain a roof over their heads but by dint of violence—their baggage left all this time on their mules' backs, and themselves without any thing to eat; and, as I promised, there is an end of this subject: I wish I could as easily get rid of the evil.

Salamanca, November 10, 1812.

Although we failed before Burgos, the enemy, in order to compel our noble leader and the division under Sir Rowland Hill to fall back, was under the necessity of draining all Spain, and uniting the whole of his disposable force for the purpose of accomplishing this object: however, now we are in our old position before Salamanca, ready to fight them; and although the left might be turned, there would be some difficulty in accomplishing it. The way these scoundrels have acted, is according to their usual plan, with superior numbers, manœuvring on our flanks; but the precision of Lord Wellington's movements, defeats their views of obtaining any advantage whilst we are retreating. War is in itself, as every one knows, uncertain; and whether John Bull is as easily depressed as elated, will be seen by the way in which this temporary reverse is received in England: when, however, I come to reflect that in the course of a campaign, we have taken two principal frontier towns, raised the siege of Cadiz, freed the provinces of Andalusia, captured 1000 pieces of artillery, and advanced to the capital, which obliged Marshal Soult to evacuate the whole of the South, I trust it will be admitted that Lord Wellington has achieved wonders, considering his limited means. Now that his Lordship is appointed Generalissimo of the Spanish armies, it is to be hoped that a new system will be adopted with regard to their organization and discipline, in both which essential points they have hitherto been remarkably deficient.

Salamanca, 10th November, 1812.

I understand we are to defend this position; the army are all ready, and willing to give the enemy a second defeat. The troops lately under Sir Rowland Hill, are in excellent order. I believe we are much out-numbered in cavalry, but the Marquis, I have no doubt, will sustain his great character, and gain a second victory at Salamanca greater than the first—and infinitely more important, as one blow will decide the contest, and such a victory will give more than life to the Spanish cause. The influx of military in this city is astonishing;—the great square, which is surrounded by a piazza, is thronged with British Officers and men of the Allied Army; and what articles there are to sell, are extremely dear: brandy eight shillings a bottle, bread two and sixpence a pound, tea five dollars a pound. It has cost me for the last fortnight nearly eight pounds for living, exclusive of bread and beef, so shamefully have we suffered by extortion; nor, for the present, have I any expectation of things being more moderate. But to see us, my friend, now, you would think we were all holiday soldiers,—all our best uniforms, gold and silver lace, with the brilliant dresses of the Spanish and Portuguese Officers, furnishes a burlesque similar to those of the 1st of May in London.

AFRICAN RECRUITING ESTABLISHMENT.

We inserted in our first Number, an account of a Recruiting Depôt to be formed at Sierra Leone and Goree, for the enlistment of men of colour, for the completion and augmentation of the West India regiments. The following communication, extracted from a public journal, cannot prove otherwise than interesting:

" *Baner Island (Africa)*, *September* 18, 1812.—According to my promise, I take the earliest opportunity to inform you of my safety, and the degree of success that has attended the African Recruiting Establishment.

" Major Wingfield embarked on board the Herald transport, No. 29, (his Staff consisting of Adjutant Henry Barry Hyde, Lieutenants Gregg and Fitzgerald, Surgeon James Johnston, Ensign Mac Queen, and Paymaster Eastlake,) at Portsmouth; together with three Officers of the Royal African Corps, and eighty men. The Herald proceeded to Africa, which shore we made on the 19th of July. We landed a few of the African Corps and one Officer at Senegal, a few men and one Officer at Goree, and the remainder of the African Corps at Sierra Leone, all in perfect health and good spirits—owing greatly to the indefatigable attention of Surgeon Johnston, in keeping the ship in a perfect state of cleanliness and purification.

" The Herald proceeded from Sierra Leone to Baner Island, the depôt for the African Recruiting Establishment, whereby the vacancies in the different West-India Regiments are to be filled and effectually completed; which will be done much sooner than was anticipated, owing to the zealous exertions of Major Wingfield and the Officers under him.

" Four Kings or Chieftains have come to this place from considerable distances up the river, particularly the Rio Conga, and have tendered their services to the Recruiting Establishment. Volunteers are flocking in by dozens every day. We shall be enabled to send to the West Indies by the 1st of October next, three hundred and fifty men and boys, from fourteen to eighteen years of age, in the Herald transport. The troops are wonderfully docile—a disposition which is excited not a little, and maintained among them by the prudent and unceasing attention of Henry Barry Hyde, whose skill in disciplining black troops has received a lasting record in the example, the achievements, and hard-earned glory of the 1st West-India Regiment. In a word, by his exertions, these troops will be formed into a most respectable corps, qualified for every useful military purpose which the service may require.

" The troops for the West Indies will be under the command of Captain Raine and Lieutenant Gregg, who, by their conciliating manners with the natives, have not only removed every obstacle which might have operated to the disadvantage of the Recruiting Establishment, but won the affections, and secured that perfect confidence from the troops which renders obedience easy, and insures discipline.

" Surgeon James Johnston will accompany the troops to the West Indies. We have all benefited highly by his rigid attention to medical discipline;—nor can language do justice to the humanity that characterizes every part of his conduct.

" We are abundantly supplied with fresh provisions by the zealous exertions of Lieutenant Quarter-Master Fitzgerald, an officer of considerable merit.

" On the 9th inst. we were alarmed by a furious tornado, accompanied by a violent earthquake, which destroyed one of our largest barracks, and buried, for the moment, fifty of our men in the ruins. Providentially they were soon extricated without the loss of a single life, but not without considerable injury to many, and very great risque to the concerned in freeing the sufferers from their temporary

graves. Every officer bore a conspicuous share in the perilous enterprize—those who suffered most, have been humanely attended to, and every comfort administered to them by the Medical Officer, Mr. Johnston, who may not only be stiled a very lucky, but a most judicious practitioner.

" Paymaster Eastlake, to whom it is hoped that the world will be rendered a debtor for successful labours in peregrinating the interior of Africa, intends to undertake that perilous though laudable adventure, about the middle of March next. He has commenced equipping himself for the enterprize—an enterprize for which he is well qualified by constitution, by youthful but well disciplined zeal and ardour, and by an extensive fund of useful information."

LIST OF CORPS SERVING IN THE PENINSULA NOV. 1.

CAVALRY.

1st and 2d Reg. Life Guards
1st Reg. Horse Guards, (Blue)
3d Reg. Dragoon Guards
4th Do. Do.
5th Do. Do.
1st Do. or Royal Dragoons
3d Do. Dragoons
4th Do. Do.
9th Do. Light Dragoons
11th Do. Do.
12th Do. Do.
13th Do. Do.
14th Do. Do.
16th Do. Do.
1st and 2d Dragoons, K. G. L.
1st and 2d Hussars, Do.

INFANTRY.

	Battalions.
1st Reg. Ft. Gds.	1st and 2d
2d Do.	1
3d Do.	1
1st Do. Foot	1
2d Do.	
3d Do.	1
4th Do.	1 and 2
5th Do.	1 and 2
6th Do.	1
7th Do.	1
9th Do.	1
10th Do.	1
11th Do.	1
20th Do.	1
23d Do.	1
24th Do.	2d
27th Do.	3d
28th Do.	1
30th Do.	2d
31st Do.	1
33d Do.	1
34th Do.	2d
35th Do.	1
36th Do.	1
38th Reg. Foot	1 and 2
39th Do.	2d
40th Do.	1
42d Do.	1
43d Do.	1
44th Do.	2d
45th Do.	1
47th Do.	2d
48th Do.	1
50th Do.	1
51st Do.	
52d Do.	1
53d Do.	2d
57th Do.	2d
58th Do.	1 and 2
59th Do.	2d
60th Do.	5th
61st Do.	1
66th Do.	1
68th Do.	
71st Do.	1
74th Do.	
79th Do.	1
81st Do.	1
82d Do.	1
83d Do.	2d
87th Do.	2d
88th Do.	1
91st Do.	1
92d Do.	1
94th Do.	
95th Do.	1, 2, and 3.

KING'S GERMAN LEGION.

1st and 2d batt. Light Infantry
1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, and 7th, batts. of the Line
1st Regt. Brunswick Oels
1st Do. Chasseurs Britanniques
1st Do. Watteville
1st Do. Calabrese
3 Brigades of Horse Artillery
2000 British and German Foot Artillery.

Total.—19 Regiments of Cavalry, 73 Battalions of Infantry, 3 Brigades of Horse Artillery, 2000 Foot Artillery, Engineers and Staff Corps.

Extracts from Army Regulations, General Orders, and Courts Martial.

Further PROCEEDINGS relative to the 1st Royal Surry Militia.

[*Continued from p.* 281.]

Horse-Guards, 10*th of August*, 1812.—WITH reference to the General Order which was issued to the Army on the 18th of June last, on the subject of abuses and irregularities which have been committed in the First Royal Surry Regiment of Militia, the Commander-in-Chief has directed that the following Copy of a Letter, which was addressed by His Royal Highness on the 6th instant, to the General Officer commanding in the Eastern District, respecting Captain Joseph Dawson, of the First Regiment of Surry Militia, shall be read at the head of every regiment, and entered in the General Order Book of each Corps.

(Signed) HARRY CALVERT, Adjutant-Gen.

MY LORD,—In reference to the Prince Regent's Commands as conveyed in my letter of the 13th of June last, that a General Court-Martial should be assembled for the trial of Captain J. Dawson, of the First Royal Surry Regiment of Militia, according to the request made by that officer before the Board of General Officers assembled to investigate the abuses and irregularities prevalent in that corps, I am now to acquaint you, that although the misconduct of Captain Dawson appeared to be of a more culpable nature than that of others who have already incurred the penalty of removal from the service, inasmuch as he appeared to be himself guilty of those gross instances of peculation and injustice, which certain of his brother Captains permitted to be practised by the Pay-Serjeants of their respective companies; yet under all the circumstances of the case, I have considered it expedient to submit to the Prince Regent, that the application of Captain Dawson to withdraw his request for a Court-Martial, shall be acceded to, upon the condition of his dismissal from His Majesty's service, with such marked publicity as may be considered due to the infamy of conduct acknowledged by the prisoner's desire to avoid investigation, and his voluntary acquiescence in such penalty.

I have therefore to acquaint you, that the Prince Regent has been pleased, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, to command that Captain Dawson shall be dismissed from His Majesty's service accordingly, and that the grounds of such dismissal shall be circulated throughout the army, in reference to the communications of the decisions already passed upon irregularities of the First Surry Militia, in which the intimation of Captain Dawson's trial by Court-Martial was included.

Your Lordship will acquaint me with the day upon which the Prince Regent's pleasure is made known to Captain Dawson, as from that day he will cease to receive pay in His Majesty's service.—I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK, Commander-in-Chief.

Copies of Letters addressed by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief to General the Earl of Chatham, K. G. or General Officer commanding in the Eastern District, dated Horse-Guards.

MY LORD,—Having laid before the Prince Regent the proceedings of a General Court Martial, held at Chelmsford on the 18th of October, 1811, and continued by adjournments to the 15th of November following, for the trial of Captain John

Ford, of the First Royal Surry Regiment of Militia, who was arraigned under the under-mentioned charge, viz:

"For having during the whole, or a great part of the period between the 1st day of January, and the 10th of September, 1811, neglected to pay his company himself, in obedience to His Majesty's orders; and for having allowed the wife, or the reputed wife of Serjeant-Major Allingham, to pay the men of his company, and provide them with necessaries, by which means the comforts and interests of the soldiers were not attended to, the men charged more than they ought to have been for necessaries, and subjected to various impositions; such conduct being highly detrimental to His Majesty's service, and to the prejudice of good order and military discipline."

Upon which Charge the Court came to the following decision:

"The Court are of opinion, that the prisoner Captain John Ford is Guilty of the charge preferred against him, in breach of the Articles of War; but taking into their most serious consideration all the circumstances detailed in evidence, and the very high and honorable character given him by his Colonel and other officers, do sentence him to be reprimanded, in such manner as His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, may be pleased to direct, and further, to be suspended from rank and pay, for the space of one calendar month."

I am to acquaint your Lordship, that under all the circumstances of the case, His Royal Highness was pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to approve the finding of Guilt, and to confirm so much of the sentence of the Court as adjudges the prisoner Captain Ford to be reprimanded and suspended for one month from rank and pay.

I am, at the same time, to acquaint your Lordship, that upon a careful consideration of the whole evidence, as detailed on the face of the proceedings, the Guilt of the prisoner, as found by the Court, appeared to the Prince Regent to have been so fully established as to have demanded a sentence more adequate to the nature of an offence, involving the first and most important duties of every officer in the service of the rank of Captain Ford; and as no evidence to general good character can in propriety be offered in extenuation of such dereliction of duty to the country, and to the service in particular, as appears to have attended the Guilt of the prisoner, whose admission of error in not paying his own company, contrary to the standing orders of the army, by which a system of gross imposition was admitted on the part of Mrs. Allingham, to whom that duty is proved to have been most improperly entrusted, would appear of itself to have been sufficient to point out to the Court, the ill-judged application of lenity to the nature of the case brought under their investigation.

Under these circumstances, the Prince Regent considered it to be due to the discipline and paramount interests of the service, that the expression of His Royal Highness's marked displeasure should be conveyed to the Officers of the Court-Martial for this very insufficient sentence, upon their own finding of Guilt against the prisoner.

I am further commanded to order, that, until a general investigation shall be instituted into the system of a corps, under which such practices could be tolerated as those which appear on the face of the proceedings, Captain Ford shall be prohibited from joining or doing duty with the First Royal Surry Regiment of Militia.

Your Lordship will acquaint me with the day upon which the sentence is made known to the prisoner, as from that day the suspension from rank and pay will take effect.—I am, &c. (Signed) FREDERICK, Commander-in-Chief.

MY LORD,—Having laid before the Prince Regent the proceedings of a General Court-Martial, held at Chelmsford, on the 18th of October, 1811, and continued by adjournment to the 26th of the same month, for the trial of Captain THOMAS CHURCHILL THOMPSON, of the First Royal Surry Regiment of Militia, who was arraigned upon the under-mentioned charge, viz:

"For having drawn and received pay for private Henry Spong, at different periods between the 1st day of April and the 1st day of September, 1811, when the same private Henry Spong was actually discharged from the 1st Royal Surry Regiment of Militia, on or about the 24th of March, 1811, such conduct being highly detrimental to His Majesty's service, and to the prejudice of good order and military discipline."

Upon which Charge the Court came to the following decision:

"The Court having most maturely considered the evidence in behalf of the prosecution, together with what the prisoner, Captain T. Churchill Thompson, has urged in his defence, are of opinion, that in drawing and receiving pay for private Henry Spong, as specified in the Charge, he has not been guilty of the smallest intentional crime, nor actuated by corrupt, fraudulent, or interested motives, and therefore entitled to a full and honorable acquittal, and he is hereby most fully and honorably acquitted."

I am to acquaint your Lordship, that under all the circumstances of the case, His Royal Highness was pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to acquiesce in the sentence of the Court.

I am at the same time to desire that your Lordship will express the Prince Regent's surprise and regret, that the Court Martial should have adopted a judgment so perfectly inconsistent with their finding; inasmuch as the Court admits the prisoner to have committed the act described in the charge, which is not only most incorrect in itself, but contrary to every principle of law, order, and regulation, and proceeds to acquit him of motives which have not been alledged against him.

I am farther commanded to order that, until a due investigation shall take place into the system of the corps, which could have professed to sanction by usage the practice charged against the prisoner, and admitted by the Court, Captain Thomas Churchill Thompson shall be prohibited from joining, and doing duty with the 1st Royal Surry Regiment of Militia.—I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK, Commander-in-Chief.

MY LORD,—Having laid before the Prince Regent the proceedings of a General Court-Martial, held at Chelmsford, on the 30th of December, 1811, and continued by adjournments to the 10th of January, 1812, for the trial of Captain RICHARD FRIZELL, of the 1st Royal Surry Militia, who was arraigned upon the under-mentioned charges, viz:

1st.—"For disobedience of His Majesty's orders, in having, during the whole, or part of the periods between the 1st of September, 1810, and 1st of September, 1811, neglected to pay his company himself, and for allowing Serjeant John Medley, and the wife, or reputed wife, of the said Serjeant John Medley, to do so, by which means the comfort and interest of the soldiers were not attended to, and the men were charged more than they ought to have been for necessaries, or than such necessaries were worth, and the soldiers were subjected to various impositions—such conduct being highly detrimental to His Majesty's service, and to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.

2d.—" For highly irregular and unmilitary conduct, in having, during the whole, or part of the periods between the 24th of February and 6th of June, 1809, drawn pay (or allowed his Pay-Serjeant to do so) for private Joseph Wood, late of his company in the 1st Royal Surry Militia, although the said Joseph Wood died on or about the 22d of February, 1809."

Upon which Charges the Court came to the following decision:

The Court having taken into their serious consideration the evidence produced by the prosecutor and prisoner, as well as the Defence and Reply, are of opinion, that the prisoner, Captain Richard Frizell, 1st Royal Surry Militia, is Guilty of the Charges preferred against him, in breach of the Articles of War, and do therefore sentence him to be dismissed the service; but in consequence of the good character given him by his Colonel, and other Officers of the Regiment, as well as the documents produced before the Court, beg leave to recommend him to the clemency of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

I am to acquaint your Lordship, that His Royal Highness was pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to approve and confirm the finding and sentence of the Court.

Your Lordship will therefore acquaint me with the day upon which the sentence is made known to the prisoner, Captain Richard Frizell, as from that day he will cease to receive pay in His Majesty's service.—I am, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK, Commander-in-Chief.

Horse-Guards, 25*th July*, 1812.

AT a General Court-Martial held at Chester, on the 21st of April, 1812, and continued by adjournments to the 23d of the same month, Lieutenant WILLIAM NASH, of the Royal North Lincoln Militia, was arraigned upon the under-mentioned Charge, viz:

" For scandalous and infamous behaviour, unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, in calumniously circulating a report at Chester in or about the month of July, and in or about the month of December, 1811, prejudicial to the honor, character, and reputation of Adjutant Gibbon Cullen of the same regiment, by falsely stating to several persons that Adjutant Cullen had been brought before the halberts, and there stripped to be punished for theft, thereby tending to deprive the said Adjutant Gibbon Cullen of that influence, authority, and command, necessary to the discharge of his duty as an officer in His Majesty's service."

Upon which Charge the Court came to the following decision:

The Court-Martial after the most attentive consideration of the evidence produced in support of the Charge against Lieutenant William Nash of the Royal North Lincoln Regiment of Militia, and of the Prisoner's Defence, are of opinion, that he is Guilty of the crime laid to his charge, and they do sentence him the said Lieutenant William Nash to be dismissed from the regiment.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent was pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to approve and confirm the finding and sentence of the Court, and the Commander-in-Chief directs, that the Charge preferred against Lieutenant William Nash, together with the finding and sentence of the Court, shall be read at the head of every Corps, and entered in the General Order Book.

By command of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief,

HARRY CALVERT, Adjutant-Gen.

GAZETTES,—

Military Dispatches,—Promotions, &c. in the Army.

(Regularly continued from our last No.)

Royal Cheshire Militia—Richard Puleston, jun. Esq. to be Captain, vice Twemlow, resigned. Dated September 19, 1812.—John Sawry, Esq. to be ditto, vice Cotton, promoted. Dated September 22, 1812.—Peter Clark Mottram, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated September 12, 1812.—Charles Richard Edwards, Gent to be ditto. Dated October 1, 1812.

38th, or Ayrshire Regiment of Militia—James Patrick, Esq. to be Captain, vice Ruthven, deceased. Dated August 17, 1812.

War-Office, October 20, 1812.

To be Lieutenants, without purchase.

Royal Regt. of Horse Guards—Cornet E. Bouverie.—Cornet C. A. Fitzroy.

To be Cornet.

Tathwell Baker Tathwell, Gent. vice Bouverie.

To be Adjutant.

Quarter-Master Simeon Hirst (with the rank of Cornet), vice Taylor, promoted.

To be Quarter-Masters.

Corporal-Major Jasper Perry, vice Hirst.—Corporal Ambrose Hitchen.—Corporal Robert Lord.

1st Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Lieutenant J. M. Whyte to be Captain of a Troop, by purchase, vice Delap, who retires.—Cornet J. R. Gordon to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Whyte.

12th Regiment of Light Dragoons—Cornet Abraham Lane to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Andrews, promoted.

20th do.—James Mac Dermot, Gent. to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Ebhart, appointed to the 72d Foot.

21st do.—James Buck, Gent. to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Aitkin, promoted.

22d do.—Lieutenant Richard Slegg to be Captain of a Troop, by purchase, vice Warren, who retires.

Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards—Ensign Augustus Cuyler, from the 69th Foot, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Greville, promoted.—Serjeant Thomas Dwelly to be Quarter-Master, vice Tomlin, deceased.

12th Regiment of Foot—Captain Richard Bayley to be Major, without purchase.

To be Captains of Companies, without purchase.

Lieutenant John Spinks.—Lieutenant James Keappock.—Lieutenant Alexander Adams, from the 84th Foot, vice Bayley.

To be Lieutenants, without purchase.

Ensign James Wadeson, vice Spinks.—Ensign Morgan Jenkins, vice Keappock.

To be Ensigns, without purchase.

John Blackall, Gent. vice Wadeson.—Henry Clinton, Gent. vice Jenkins.

16th do.—Lieutenant John Cosby to be Captain of a Company, vice Burke, placed upon half-pay.—Ensign John Gun to be Lieutenant, vice Cosby.—Gentleman Cadet Edward Cleather, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, vice Gun.

16th do.—Ensign Mark Hayes to be Lieutenant, vice Blakeney, placed upon half-pay.

21st do.—Lieutenant Robert Gordon to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Whitaker, promoted.

24th do.—Ensign John de Neys to be Lieutenant, vice Walton, killed in action.

To be Ensigns.

Serjeant-Major ...... Fry, from the 95th Foot, vice Nunn, deceased.—Volunteer Henry Whigmore, from the 5th Foot, vice De Neys.

28th do.—Assistant-Surgeon John Lightbody, from the 71st Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Boggie, promoted.

33d do.—Ensign Henry Bain, from the 1st West York Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

To be Lieutenants.

42d do.—Ensign Alexander Dickinson, vice Gregorson, killed in action.—Ensign Alexander Innes, vice Milne, killed in action.

To be Ensigns.

Volunteer J. Lane, vice Cullen, killed in action.—Mungo Macpherson, Gent. vice Dickinson.—Colin Walker, Gent. vice Innes.

To be Assistant-Surgeon.

Assistant-Surgeon Duncan Henderson, from the 48th Foot, vice M'Coll, deceased.

43d do.—Ensign T. H. Grubbe to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Shaw, promoted.—Hospital-Mate Henry Edwards to be Asssistant-Surgeon, vice Cumin, promoted in the 88th Foot.

47th do.—Assistant-Surgeon Edward O'Leary, from the 52d Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Harpur, promoted.

59th do.—Lieutenant John Fothergill to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Fairfield, who retires.—Ensign George A. S. Fane to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Fothergill.—Lieutenant Marcus O'Hara, from the Antrim Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

60th do.—Serjeant .... Maxwell, from the 83d Foot, to be Quarter-Master, vice Verbregge, deceased.

62d do.—Ensign William Blakeley to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Robinson, who resigns.

63d do.—Lieutenant John Duport to be Adjutant, vice Church, who resigns the Adjutancy only.

69th do.—Edmund Martin Wightwick, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Cuyler, appointed to the Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards.

71st do.—Hospital-Mate John Donaldson to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Lightbody, promoted in the 28th Foot.

72d do.—Lieutenant Robert Bland to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Graves, promoted.

79th do.—Brevet Major Andrew Brown to be Major, vice Lawrie, killed in action.—Lieutenant Alexander Maclean to be Captain of a Company, vice Brown.

To be Lieutenants, without purchase.

Ensign Thomas Walbeoff, vice Macdonald, dead of his wounds.—Ensign James Hall, vice H. Grant, dead of his wounds.—Ensign John Powling, vice Maclean.

To be Ensigns.

Lachlan M'Lean Cameron, Gent. vice Walbeoffe.—Volunteer Anthony Archer, from the 94th Foot, vice Hall.—Ogle Conner, Gent. vice Powling.

84th do.—Ensign E. J. Mockler to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Adams, promoted in the 12th Foot.—J. Hadden Slyfield, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Mockler.

88th do.—Assistant-Surgeon W. Cumin, from the 43d Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Arthur, promoted.

89th do.—Lieutenant Gorge Jones to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Crespigny, promoted in the 68th Foot.—Ensign John H. Latham to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Jones.

93d do.—Ensign Charles Gordon to be Lieutenant, vice Sutherland, deceased.—Lieutenant George Menzies, from the Fife Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

94th do.—Ensign Robert Macnab, from the Edinburgh Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

96th do.—Ensign Charles Dutton to be Lieutenant, vice Ashley, placed upon half-pay.—Joseph Crips, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Dutton.

2d Royal Veteran Battalion—Captain R. Woods, from the 5th West-India Regiment, to be Captain of a Company, vice Lucas, placed upon the Retired List.

Royal African Corps—Lieutenant Adam Fife to be Captain of a Company, vice Megaw, placed upon half-pay.

Royal York Rangers—Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Ward, from the 27th Foot, to be Major, without purchase, vice Barclay, promoted in the Royal Corsican Rangers.

Royal Waggon Train—Lieutenant John Sidaway to be Captain of a Troop, vice Whittle, deceased.—Cornet Adrian Eyma to be Lieutenant, vice Sidaway.—Regimental Serjeant-Major Henry Winkelman, from the 3d Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, to be Cornet, vice Eyma.

STAFF.

Captain Philip Bainbridge, from the 93d Foot, to be a Permanent Assistant Quarter-Master-General, with the rank of Major in the Army, vice Pierrepoint, killed in action.—Lieutenant A. Dalgetty, from the 101st Foot, to be Staff Captain at the Depôt at York Hospital.

HOSPITAL STAFF.

Staff-Surgeon Henry Irwin, M. D. to be Physician to the Forces.

To be Surgeons to the Forces.

Surgeon James Arthur, from the 88th Foot, vice Irwin.—Surgeon Wm. Harpur, from the 47th Foot.—Surgeon John Boggie, from the 28th Foot.

To be Purveyor to the Forces.

Deputy-Purveyor Thomas Hume Bowles.

To be Deputy Purveyors to the Forces.

Purveyor's-Clerk Samuel Cooper.—Purveyor's-Clerk George Winter.—Purveyor's-Clerk William Clapp.—Purveyor's-Clerk Charles Soare.

To be Hospital-Mate for General Service.

Thomas Soden, Gent.

The King's German Legion.

2d Battalion Light Infantry—Assistant-Surgeon George Heisse, from the Foot Artillery, to be Surgeon.—Hospital-Mate J. D. Lange to be Assistant-Surgeon.

3d Batt. of the Line—E. H. Kuckuck, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Borgstedt, promoted.

To be Ensigns.

8th do.—Cadet-Serjeant William de Murreau, vice Buckler, promoted.—Cadet-Serjeant Edward Stanley.

The Duke of Brunswick Oels' Corps.

Ensign Schneider to be Lieutenant, vice Konowsky, superseded.—Corporal Biermon, from the Cavalry, to be Ensign, vice Schneider.—Hospital-Mate Ferdinand Hunerbein to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Lieblen, who resigns.

Chasseurs Britanniques.

Ensign .... D'Olbreuse to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice De Chaillet, appointed to the Bourbon Regt.—A. Dalton, Gent. to be Ensign, vice D'Olbreuse.

Royal Corsican Rangers.

Major Delaney Barclay, from the Royal York Rangers, to be Lieutenant-Colonel, vice Ansley placed upon half-pay.

MEMORANDUM.

Ensign Field, of the 41st Foot, is superseded, being absent without leave.—Ensign L'Estrange, of the 66th Foot, is superseded.

The appointment of Mr. Robert Paisley to be Hospital-Mate for General Service, as stated in the Gazette of the 26th ultimo, has not taken place.

Bedford Regt. of Militia—W. Sweeting, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated Sept. 19, 1812.

Downing-Street, October 25, 1812.

A DISPATCH, of which the following is an extract, has been this day received at Earl Bathurst's office, addressed to his Lordship by General the Marquis of Wellington, dated Villa Tora, 11th October, 1812.

The enemy have made two sorties on the head of the sap, between the exterior and interior lines of the castle of Burgos, in both of which they materially injured our works, and we suffered some loss. In the last, at three in the morning of the 8th, we had the misfortune to lose the Hon. Major Cocks, of the 79th, who was field-officer of the trenches, and was killed in the act of rallying the troops who had been driven in. I have frequently had occasion to draw your Lordship's atten-

tion to the conduct of Major Cocks, and in one instance very recently, in the attack of the hornwork of the castle of Burgos; and I consider his loss as one of the greatest importance to this army, and to His Majesty's service.

Notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy, our troops are established within about one hundred yards of the enemy's interior line, which we have it in our power to assault; and we have effected a good breach in another part of the same line, and our troops are established close to the breach.

We are carrying on our works under ground, and I hope that I shall have another mine in readiness in a day or two.

The enemy have not made any movement to interrupt our operations; they are still upon the Ebro.

By the accounts which I have from Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill of the 7th instant, it appears that Marshal Soult joined Joseph Buonaparte on the frontier of Valencia and Murcia, on the 29th September. A detachment of Marshal Soult's army occupied Albacete on the 3d instant, and a small detachment of cavalry was as far forward as Minaya on the 6th instant.

I have not yet heard of General Ballasteros having passed the Sierra Morena, or at all of his movements since the 17th of September, when he entered Grenada; nor have I heard from Major-General Cooke, since he received my directions for the movement of the troops under his command.

I have reports, however, that the troops marched from Seville on the 28th Sept.

P. S. I have the honour to inclose the return of our loss since the 5th instant.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the command of His Excellency General the Marquis of Wellington, K. B. in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 6th to the 10th of October, 1812, inclusive.

Royal Artillery—2 rank and file killed; 1 capt. 1 lieut. 7 rank and file wounded.

Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt.—1 ensign, 11 rank and file, killed; 27 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.

3d Guards, 1st Batt.—4 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 2 serjeants, 1 drummer, 10 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.

1st Foot, or Royal Scots, 3d Batt.—1 captain wounded.

9th Foot, 1st Batt.—1 lieutenant wounded.

11th Foot, 1st Batt.—1 rank and file wounded.

24th Foot, 2d Batt.—2 rank and file killed; 6 rank and file wounded.

32d Foot, 1st Batt.—3 rank and file wounded.

36th Foot, 1st Batt.—1 rank and file killed.

38th Foot—1 lieutenant, 2 ensigns, wounded.

42d Foot, 1st Batt.—1 serjeant, 6 rank and file, killed; 20 rank and file wounded.

58th Foot, 2d Batt.—1 staff, 1 rank and file, killed; 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 7 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.

60th Foot, 5th Batt.—2 rank and file killed.

79th Foot, 1st Batt.—1 major, 6 rank and file, killed; 1 serjeant, 27 rank and file, wounded; 3 rank and file missing.

1st Line Batt. King's German Legion—1 captain, 19 rank and file, killed; 23 rank and file wounded.

2d do. do.—1 serjeant, 18 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 2 serjeants, 1 drummer, 45 rank and file, wounded.

5th do. do.—1 lieutenant, 2 serjeants, 10 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 24 rank and file, wounded.

Total British loss—1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 staff, 4 serjeants, 82 rank and file, killed; 5 captains, 5 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 7 serjeants, 3 drummers, 200 rank and file, wounded; 7 rank and file missing.

Total Portuguese loss—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 34 rank and file, killed; 1 major, 3 captains, 1 serjeant, 65 rank and file, wounded; 11 rank and file missing.

Total British and Portuguese loss—1 major, 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 staff, 4 serjeants, 116 rank and file, killed; 1 major, 8 captains, 5 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 8 serjeants, 3 drummers, 265 rank and file, wounded; 18 rank and file missing.

S. A. GOODMAN, D. A. A. Gen.

Names of British Officers killed and wounded.

KILLED.

Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt.—Ensign Buckeridge.
58th Foot, 2d Batt.—Adjutant Hobson.
79th Foot, 1st Batt.—Major the Honourable E. Cocks.
1st Line Batt. King's German Legion—Captain Saffe.
5th do. do.—Lieutenant Winckler.

WOUNDED.

1st Royal Scots—*Captain Stewart, Acting Engineer, slightly.
38th Foot—*Captain M'Pherson, severely (since dead); *Ensigns Lawrence and *Twigg, slightly.
Royal Artillery—Captain Power and Lieutenant Elgie, slightly.
3d Quards, 1st Batt.—Captain Clitherow, severely.
9th Foot, 1st Batt.—Lieutenant Dumareusq, Assistant Engineer, severely.
2d Line Batt. King's German Legion—Capt. Langrehr and Lieut. Wynecke, severely.
5th do. do.—Captain Lodders and Lieutenant Goeben, severely.

Names of Portuguese Officers killed and wounded.

KILLED.

5th Cacadores—Captain Henry Perry,
Artillery—Lieutenant F. X. Parreira.

WOUNDED.

12th Regiment of the Line—Major Arnott, and Captains A. de Madeira and L. de Madeira.
15th do.—Captain Gama, Acting Engineer.

The Officers marked thus (*) were wounded on the Evening of the 4th and Morning of the 6th, but the Return was received too late for insertion.

Riga, October 3, 1812.—SIR, In my last I had the honour to inform you, that an attack on the Prussians in this vicinity was intended to take place about the 26th ultimo. A considerable body of troops, under Count Steinheil, left Riga on that day, and the gun-boats under the command of the English officers accompanied a strong division of forty Russian boats, besides ten launches, under the command of Admiral Muller, up the River Aa.

The enemy had withdrawn his troops from Schlock, and his other posts, on the approach of the boats. We therefore did not meet with any opposition until the 29th, when, about five miles below Mittau, the enemy had there placed three different booms across the river, about half a mile distant from each other. Within pistol-shot of the third boom, which was very strong, and well constructed, were placed three batteries of four guns each. The booms were soon destroyed, and as we arrived up, the enemy abandoned their positions with such precipitation, that four twenty-four-pounders were left in the works.

The English boats were always in advance, and Admiral Muller has desired me to say, how much he is pleased with the exertions of Captain Brenton and the lieutenants employed in the boats.

The flotilla took possession of Mittau about noon; the enemy had not time to remove some very considerable magazines of clothing, grain, and some arms and ammunition. He also left about four hnndred sick and wounded in the town. In the evening, a detachment of the army entered the town.

The Prussians retreated from Olai upon Bourski, where they had about one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, intended for the siege of this place; they there received reinforcements on the 29th, which Macdonald had sent them from Jacobstadt.

On the 30th the Russians were compelled to retire from before a force of twenty-five thousand men, who had nearly eighty pieces of cannon. As the troops had retired to the vicinity of Riga, the flotilla left Mittau in the evening of the 30th; and after destroying a bridge, which had been erected to facilitate the crossing of the troops and artillery, arrived at Danamunde last night.

October 4.—The enemy's works, which were of considerable strength at Olai, were destroyed.

The loss on the part of the Russians is estimated at two thousand in killed, wounded, and missing. The enemy must also have suffered severely, and many prisoners are arrived. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) HEW STEWART.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c. Aboukir.

War-Office, October 27, 1812.

In consequence of the distinguished gallantry displayed by the 2d battalion of the 87th regiment, in successfully defending the breach at Tarifa, in Spain, on the 31st December, 1811, against a superior force of the enemy, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, has been pleased to approve of the word "*Tarifa*" being borne upon the colours and appointments of the 87th regiment, in addition to any other badges or devices which may have heretofore been granted to that regiment.

War-Office, October 27, 1812.

1st Regiment of Life Guards—Lieutenant ..... Gireen, from the 10th Light Dragoons, to be Captain of a Troop, without purchase.—Thomas Eman, Gent. late Captain in the 40th Foot, to be Adjutant, with the rank of Cornet and Sub-Lieutenant.

2d do.—Assistant-Surgeon ...... Broughton to be Surgeon, with temporary rank.

3d Regiment of Dragoons—Cornet George Watson to be Lieutenant, vice Selby killed in action.

9th Regiment of Light Dragoons—Assistant-Surgeon Edward Purdon, from the 88th Foot, to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Swift, who resigns.

10th do.—Hospital-Mate Samuel Jenks to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Purdon, whose appointment has not taken place.

18th do.—Cornet James Morris to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Mansfield, who retires.

22d do.—Ensign James Boalth, from the 80th Foot, to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Eden, promoted.

8th Regiment of Foot—Ensign William Bradford to be Lieutenant, vice Cumming, deceased.—Robert Macnair, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Bradford.

9th do.—Lieutenant John Macnamara to be Captain of a Company, vice Kenney, dead of his wounds.

To be Lieutenants.

Ensign James Scargill, vice Mathews, deceased.—Ensign Charles Carver, vice Macnamara.

To be Ensigns.

David Holmes, Gent. vice Scargill.—George Bolton, Gent. vice Carver.

11th do.—Lieutenant Charles B. Turner to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Barker, who retires.—Ensign R. Ferrall to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Stewart, who resigns.

14th Regiment of Foot—Captain Trevor Stannus to be Major, vice Miller, deceased. Lieutenant M. C. Wilkinson to be Captain of a Company, vice Stannus.—Ensign Jacob Meek to be Lieutenant, vice Wilkinson.—Gentleman Cadet Henry Thomas Oakes, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, vice Meek.

24th do.—Lieutenant John Ward to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Irby, appointed to the 2d Regiment of Life Guards.

27th do.—Ensign Robert Bakewell to be Lieutenant, vice Thompson, deceased.—James O'Connor, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Bakewell.

31st do.—Ensign James Elwyn to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Wynne, appointed to the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards.

36th do.—Captain C. Harvey Smith, from the 40th Foot, to be Captain of a Company, vice Morrow, who exchanges.—Quarter-Master-Serjeant John Manby to be Quarter-Master, vice Medley, promoted in the 2d Royal Veteran Battalion.

ERRATA.—In page 23, line 28, *for* "150,000," *read* "1,500,000."